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THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION IN
EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW

MARTIN GELTER*

In its opinions in the ases (enttros, Clberseeringand InspireArt, the E6y has begun to open
European corporate latfor regulaton competition, as it has been discussed in the US for
seOeraldecades. ihis artile analyses the stuictual onditions ofcompetition on the suppy and
demand sides of the marke for corporate la, and the impact of supranationalinfluence. In
doing so.,
it identjes ,eealfactorsthat have received
little attention in the incipientEuropean
debate. ihe suppy side analysis shoecs that a EuropeanDelawrare is implausible because of
/heinterdependee of competitie ad ana es and in enioe to compete. On the demand side,

an anaysis of the effects of dffrences of/inancialstrituteo indicates that arace to the bottom
ismore likely in Europe. he comparatively wceak threat of supranationalintervention in
Europe makes actionsand decision making an unlikelfactorto affect the decisions of national
actors.

A.

INTRODUCTION

1. The ECJ Opens the Door
As foreshadowed by Centros1 in 1999, the ECJ has made it clear irthe C berseering,
decision of 2002 that the real seat theory is incompatible with the principle of
freedom of establishment. That theory, which previously dominated the conflict
of laws rules in many EU Member States', was deemed impermissible by that

* nivcrsi(asassistcnt, "ii
isehal
sIuni ve sitat Wien, Vienna, Ausria. Olin Fellow in LawN and
Lconomics at Harvard Law School, September 2003 toJanuary 2005. Fhiiancial support from the
Olin Center 16rLavv, Economics and Business at Harvard Law\ School isgratelully acknowlcedged.
I have published a paper for a German-language audience (written mostly in 2003 asAt Getter,
"'\\ubexcibsbcclingungcn un curopaischen c sellschaltsrceht" (2004) Zedsch?/.ffir RechLs
i__v, -u 170 86, from which thisarticle
has developed. Some arguments have been
Subsanuively revised and expanded. I wvould like to thank Thomas Bachneir ir encouraging mc to
pubIl
ishny thoughts alsoin Lnglish, and John Armour, Thomas Haberer, Christian Nowo tny,
Mathias Sicmns and Tobias Trmcgcr I6r
commens oidiscussion in various stages of my work.
Case C 212/97 (,elntr
Ltd LiuvE -ogSet1kabt, 119991 LCR 1159.
2 Case C 208/00 [ berseerng BV t\.
(....
slrtClio ompai
q
Baunaoaygonenii GnbH [2002] ECR
9919.
The real scat theory is utsed
in Ausria, Belgium, Francc, Germany,Italy
and Luxemburg, wvhile
various forns of the incorporation theory dominate in common law jurisdictions,
the
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opinion, at the xvcry least in the strict form previously employed in Germany,
where legal capacity was denied to foreign corporations that had moved their
"real seat" there. Legal capacity thus needs to be assessed under the law of the
state of incorporation; 4 Member States are required to allow companies to
"move in" while retaining their legal personality' and their limited liability."
However, the existing case law, at least explicitly, does not yet prevent the state of
incorporation from preventing companies from "moving out" of a particular
jurisdiction.
In the -IspireArt opinion of 2003,' the ECJ found a Dutch statute9 to be
equally incompatible with primary EU law. Dutch law subjected "formally
foreign companies", whose activity was limited primarily to the Netherlands, to
special disclosure provisions and a minimum actual capital requirement of
C18,000. Violations were sanctioned with stiff personal liability of managers.
While founding a corporation in another state to circumvent national
requirements is thus considered legitimate by the ECJ, Member States are only
entitled to take measures "to prevent individuals from improperly or fraudulently
taking advantage of provisions of Community law". Under what exact
Netherlands, Switzerland, Licchtcnsein and Scandinavia. For comparative overviews see,eg
K Baelz and T Baldwin, "The Lnd of the Real Seat Iheory (Sitztheorie,: the European Court of
Justice Decision in Ucbcrsccring ol"5 November 2002 and its Inpact on German and European
Company Law" (2002'3 Ccirma hiw.7our;nal no 12, para 9;1'J Omar, "Centrcs, Uberseering and
Beyond: A European Rcipe otrCorporate M\igralion, Patt I" (2004) 15 Ialalioaal C(ommercial
aotd Colf/)' La, I'?
Raiew.398-40(. For a detailed discussion of Dutch, English, Swiss, German,
French and talian law, seeS Ramtncloo, Corporalions in Pritale lernalionalLow (xlord University
Press, 2001,, 95 236.
1 S Ratntncloo, "The Long and lWinding Road towards Freedom of' Establishmcnt lor Legal
Persons in Europe" (2003) 10 laatriclt fural (f Eurqa/ aid Comaratire Lo/., 169, 18 186.
5 (Gtrnan)Bundcsgerichtsho. 13 March 2003, VIII ZR 370/98, (2003) 56 Der Benieb 986;
W\H Roth, "lFrom Centros to Ueberseering,Free Movement of Companies, Private International
Law and Community La\" (2003)52 Jnernalional and C(mparaie Jaw Quarl
177, 196.
Eg Baelz and Baldwin, sura n 3, para 22; contra Eva Micheler, '. Recognition of Companies
Incorporacd in Othcr EU Member States" (2003) 52 nraaional and C omparalire Lai ()araly
521, 526 (pointing out that 1 berseering was not concerned with limited liability);
see also
T Bachnct "Freedom of Establishtnent ir Companies: A Grceat Leap Forwai"
(2003) 62
Cambridge Lai.jour;tal
7, 19 ("this
isthe end of the theory of the real seat").
Thus, (lase C 81/87 The ueen
and Hl Teasur ad Commissioners q1 nland Rue ex park Daily
Alailaod Cce
ocal7iru
t PLC 119891 ECR 5 183, remains good law (see,
eg Bayerisches Obersters
Landgcrich, I I February 2004, 3 Z 175/03, (2004)95 mbH Rundchau 490; Roth, supra n 5, 184;
F Woolridge, "berseering:
Freedom of Establishment of Companies Affirmed" (2003) 14
European Business Law Reiew 227, 232; Mhichlct supra n 6, 524). For a long tine, DI H/old had
been used as a Justitication
fcr the real seat theory (eg H Halblthuber, "National Doctrinal
Structurcs and European Company La" (200 I)38 C(ommon Harke Law Retiew 1385, 1391 95
(characterising thisas a misreading of the case,;
MNicheler, cufra n 6, 522 (pohting out dicta
supporting that construc(lion)).
Case ( 167/01 tc/ner rant
haodel abriekeid
roorb/
1Am.dcrm lh.sireArtLtd
c
120031 ECR 10155.
'Act op tieFormccl Buitcnlandsc Vcnnootschappcn, Staatsblad van hct Kooninkrijk dcr
Nederlanden, 1997/697. See KE Sorensen and 1\MNevitle, "Corporate Migration in the
European Union" (2000)6 Col/abia journal q! Turopean Law 181, 187 88; Ratnmcloo, sura n 4,
194 (both suggesting that such laws might be a good solution).
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circumstances that is permitted is not yet entirely clear;'0 in any case,
broad-sweeping measures depending solely on the fact that a company is
incorporated in another Member State are not permissible. '' Essentially, the ECJ
has thus opened the door to regulatory competition in the corporate law of EU
and EEA countries.
2. The US Model of Regulatory Competition
Regulatory competition has been discussed in the US for several decades. The
cornerstones of this debate are well known: some argue that regulatory
competition has led to a race to the top (i.e. to optimal or near-optimal law),
while others submit that a race to the bottom has been going on. While the first
school of thought asserts that corporations need to cater to shareholder interest
to attract investment and thus incorporate in a jurisdiction with good law, the
second cites failures and inefficiencies of capital markets as reasons for the
exploitation of jurisdictional competition in favour of managers.' The empirical
evidence is inconclusixe: a 2001 study by Robert Dames found that Delaware
corporations had a higher shareholder value (measured by Tobin's Q 4) than
Io Eg HI dc Kluive, "Inspiring a Neov European Company Law" (2004) 1 uropean (mpa
and
Financial
La., Rn it, 121, 128 31;A Looijestijn-Clearie, "Have the Dikes Collapsed? Inspire Art a
Further Breakhiough in tlc Freedom of Establishment of Companies?" 2)1)4 5 Furopeon
Bb ,e Oigalizafion/
L// , P
,ix
.,389, 10) 14.
1 Eg N Adensatner and C Beivxc ts, "Nationaler Glatibigerschulz atul dun Prultand" (20(3) 2 1
.t t
sh Rehit dci I'li ft/aft 617, 618; de Kluiver, vulva n 10, 127; Looijestijn-Clearie,
supra n 10, 404. Intcrcstingl\, te US states of( Calibirnia and New York have statutces on
"1,v-,U1061foreign corporations" comparable to the Iutch one. See, eg \\J Carne, "Ile Political
Economy of Compctition i(rCorporace Charcrs" (1997) 16 JournaalJJrta! Sludies 303, 314 15;
S Grundmann, "\Vettbewerb der Regelgeber im Europiisclien Gesellschaftsrecht
edes
Marktscgmnent hat seine Stiktu" (20)1) 30 Zeilscrif jar Lialern/mums and (resellihajtsrecl
783,
803; El Kieninger, fitttltrb dci i at/ct hf oidn/hgt i Puroiii i/rl nii arkt (Ttfibingen, Mohr
Sicbeck, 2))2, 109 12;( Ke rsting,
"Corporate Choice of Law A Comparison of the United
States and Luropean Sys tems and a Proposal for a Luropean Directive" (2002'28 BrookIy /ournal
o]Iurenal/ioaol Law 1, 16 37; R Drthry *A European Look at the American Experience of'tie
Delaware Syndrome" (2005)5 Jur//l ()I'(,o/i/orat
la Studic 1, 16 21.
12 RK \\Vin e, "State Lav. Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of'tie Corporation" (1977) 6
.7ourluLt
" galStudies 2 1;RK \Vrnter, "'lie 'Race to the lp' Re vitei'd" 1989 89 (ol/hmbia
La/
Retiew 1526; FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, The Etiona
u/c o Corporoir L:,L (Cambridge
IA, Harvard lUJniversity Press, 1991, 212 27; R Romano, I/h ()i
bf Amit,
*/ ( iorite lna,
,\Vashington, AEI Press, 1993). Romano also argues that regulatory competition in Secrtiiiies
Regulation woult be equally beneficial. R Romano, 'Empowering Investors:
A Market Approach
to Securities Regulation" (1998) 10i7 Wae L
Journal 2359; R Romano, "The Need Ioi
Competition in lnternational Securities Regulation" (2001' 2 TheoreicalhIquirie Into Liu 387;
R Romano, The ,& f
o nprlii.arederalini1r
10/ riieRuilalioa (\Vashington, AEI Press,
2002).
1- This viexv
traces its roots back toJustice Brandeis's dissent in LoiA IrLigel Co. t Lee 288 US 517,
j9 (1933) and was famously brought forward by \\L Car), "Federalism and Corporate Law:
Rellcions Upon Delaware" (1974) 83 MateLz journal 663. It has been reaflfimed with the tools
of law and economics by LA Beblihuk, "lFederalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Lawv" (1992) 10 Harvrod Law Retiew 1442.
14 lbin's 0is calculated by dividing market value by the replacement value of assets.
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others."J However, a 2004 paper by Guhan Subramanian shows that this effect
disappears from 1996 onwards.' This can probably be explained by the market
for corporate control to a significant degree, which is often considered the single
most important issue affecting shareholder value, as it supposedly curbs
managerial self-serving behaviour. Benefits to shareholders reaped at that front
appear to have been largely eliminated by more recent Delaware case law,'
which effectiv ely gives the board a 'just say no" defence against takeovers and
thus replicates 8 the effects of the more effective anti-takeover statutes in other
US states."
The core result of regulatory competition in the US is the supply-side dominance of the state of Delaware, where almost 60% of public US corporations are
15 R Daines, "Does Delaware Law Iprove Firm Value?" (2001) 62 7ournam
1
f Fiammcial/Eonomits525
finding an advantage of 2 3% in value). Some argue that this cffct might be dtie to reverse
causalit), because that better managed corporations are more likely to incorporate in Delaware.
I.A Bebrhuk and A Ferrell, 'A Ncxw Approach to Takeover la\w and Regulatory Compct66on"
(2001) 87 1nomia bt, leiei, 111, 137 38, LA Bebchuk, A (,ofien and A Ferrell, "Does the
Evidence Fa\ r State Competition in Corporate La"
(2002) 90 Calijornia law Rc mu. 1775,
1786 -87 (criticising Daines's study on grounds of the fluctuations in firm value lie finds).
G Subramanian, "The Disappearing Delaware Eflec" (2004) 20 Journal qJ Lowt, Fcois
a-d
0iga)-u tiot, 32.
17 A
(he Delaware Supreme rout thad permitted tie poison pill in Uoeran v Household Julernaonal
tler
lA., 010 A 2d 1346 (Del 1985', the crucial issue was when the board has to "pull" the pill or lo er
o(her takeover defknces. Originally the courts employed an arguably rather strict(est, resting oil
the decision whether a defence was reasonable to the threat posed bly the takeover I, oca! ( 2,
Mesa Perun C(o.,493 A 2d 946 (Del 1985); See .A Bechuk and A Ferrell, "Federalism and
Corporate Law: The Race to Protect M~anagers from takeovers" (1999) 99 Columbia L, RIen
1 168, 118);
y' Capiallssociaes v Inerco Jm, 551 A 2d 787 (Del Ch 1988), tejeced by Paa oan
(Aommi, aio I,
hwTmeIn, 571 A 2d 114 0 (Del 1990)). This test was narrowed down in 1 tit,
nv AranI (Ceneral Corp, 651 A 2d 1361 (Del 199.5) to prohibit only "draconian", ic "coercive"
and "pre lusive" defences. See, eg RJ Gilson, "Unocal Fifteen Years Later" (2000) 26 1) . ale
journal J Corwoale Low 491, 500 I; Subratnanian, supra n 16, 53.
Delaware's own anti-takeover statute (DGCL s 2(03 has a reputation of being relatively
permissive towvards hostile takeovers. See, eg N[ Kahan and EB Rock, "Hoxx I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Loxe the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeoxer Law" (2002' 69 1 i en/f) a (,'ha ago
Lbu Re
871, 894; WT Allen, JB Jacobs and I.E Strine, "The Great Takeover Debate: A
Mlediation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide" (2002' 69 1a inrviti (f Chc:(ogo L.., Rie te 1067,
1068 n 2; see I.A Bebtkchk,JC Coates and G Subratnanian, "The PowerItl An6takeover Force of
Staggered Boards: Further F indings and a Reply to Symposium Participants" (2hu3) 55 Stanard
Low Reriew 855, 91 I 12 (saing Ihat legislation intended to leave (ie Iurther development to case
law). But see G Subramanian, "The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice:
Evidence on the 'Race' Debate and Antiakeover Overreaching" (2002) 150 Viversil) oj
Pem.giraniaLo.w Reie.w 1795 (finding a trend towards incorporations in states with strict takeover
statthtes, ie those beneliial to managerial entechmntit, which stop short only of the most
extreme statutes,; Bebclink et a/, supia n 15, 1818 (arguing that / ontrol-share-acquisition statutes
and poisoti-pill-ctidotrsC tflC nt statttes aMact most ou(-ofstate incorporations).
Subramanian, su/ia n 16, 52 55; Bebclink et a, sufra ii 15, 1803. 1For (erviews on anti-takeov er
statutes see, eg W\T Allen and R Kraaktan, Cornaeniaoes and Cases on 1/u Jaw oJ Business
O(aaizatios (Nexx Xork, Aspen, 200,3), 518 7; RC Clark, (oi 7irah Lowt (New York, Aspen, 198,
568 71; Bebrhtik and Fcrrell, supra n 17; see also R Romano, "Law as a Product: Soen Pieces of
the Incorporation Puzzle" (198) 1 fonrn( qt La., E,0o,1/its and Lb(anJization 225, 265 (fining that
a signilicant proportion of reineorporations results li'oit the delfnce against hostile takeovers).

October

2005

Journalof Corporate Lah Studies

registered2 Beside that, incorporation patterns show a home-state bias,
especially among smaller firms.2' This has led some scholars to doubt whether
any other state is seriously committed to the market for corporate law. 2 In any
case, there seems to be some agreement that Delaware is able to extract
monopoly rents from its "customers" on the demand side of the market."'
3. Is Europe Different?
The European debate, fuelled by Centros and its progeny, stands only at the
beginning. This article, while largely trying to avoid the pitfalls of specific
predictions on substantive outcomes in the law, investigates the institutional
framework within which competition will operate. I argue that there are
significant dexviations from the US model which should lead us to expect a
different outcome. On the supply side, I ask whether any state will be able to
establish itself as a monopolist comparable to Delaware (Section B). Even though
the answer is a clear no, this does not entirely rule out regulatory competition.
The discussion of the demand side in Section C is concerned mostly with
deviating share ownership and financial patterns, which are likely to require a
substantively different corporate law and steer competition into a different
direction2 4 Section D inxestigates the influence of actual and potential
federalisation or supranationalisation on the development of competition.

B.

SUPPLY SIDE: PERSPECTIVES FOR A EUROPEAN DELAWARE

1. Delaware's Past and Europe's Future
The historical background of how Delaware obtained its monopoly position is
well known. NewJersey first offered the developing large trusts (such as Standard

21

A Bechuk and A Harndani, "Vigorotis Race or Leisurely \Valk: Reconsidering thc (ornpeiioin
over Corporate Charters" (2002' 112 ileLayournal 553, 568 (finding that in 1999 57.75% were
incorporated in Delawvare, including59% of the Fortune 500 and 68R% corporations wvhicb had
recentty gone public). See Subrarnanian, ;upfa
n 18, 1795 (estimating a Herfindal Hirschman
Index (HHI)of 2662, which corresponds to a market concentration that would usually cause

concern to antitrust
authorities).
21 Bebchuk and Haindani, supran 20; R Daines, "The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firns" (2002)
77 .\
itYrk tni7fo-vit b.a, Rit
1559; See Romano, ulia n 19, 278 (considering the
identification of company and state as an immaterial asset wvhich
would be lost in case of a
reincorporation in Delaware).

2 M Kahan and E Kamai. "The Myth of State Competition in Corporatc Law" (2002)55 Slaqrd
La., Pha,. 679; Bebchliuk and Hamdani, supia
n 20.
23 Bebchuk and Harndani, supra n 20, 582 83.
21 Needless to say, there are also sofle obvious tactors potentially affecting markets, eg cultural
pefi enes.I address those briely in Section (G I and take thein as an exogenotis inlluence that
will most likely reduce the defand for out-of stateincorporations.
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Oil of Ohio) advantages they could not get in other states, most of all the power
to hold shares in other corporations.2 It also introduced the franchise tax."
When Governor Woodrow Wilson sought to become president, he could not
uphold this policy against public opinion, and NewJersey's Seven Sisters Act of
1913 reversing that policy drove the trusts to Delaware,"' which had previously
copied New Jersey corporate law. Its neighbour's blunder made Delaware the
home of most large American corporations overnight, and it has managed to
hold on to that position since then."'
For the European debate, it suffices to point out that Delaware's position was
the result of historical accident, which only could happen because of a rapid
concentration process in the industrialising late-nineteenth-century US, which
brought an important share of the economy first to New Jersey and then to
Delaware. New Jersey's and later Delaware's unusual position is crucial for
regulatory competition in the US. At present, there is no reason to believe that
anything on a comparable scale would happen in Europe, which could grant
anyone in the EU or EEA a huge first-mover advantage through a massive
migratory wave among large firms; no single issue that is only addressed by the
law of one state is likely to become that important.3 We shall see that, without
the peculiar incentive structure put into place by that great migration, many of
the properties of regulatory competition are fundamentally changed, particularly
with respect to the issue which states are well-positioned to offer law favoured by
the competitixe process (Section B.2), which, other than in the US, does not
appear to coincide with the question which states have incentives that will
require them to do so (Section B.3).

21 See 1J Roe, "Delaware's Competition" (2003) 117 llarardLow, Rmi a 588, 608 10 (discussing

Standard Oil ofi O hicvhk h obtaincd monopolistic power under the control ofJohn D
Rocketeller); Drury, u/ia n 11, 3 7.
26 See C Grandy "Ne\ Jcrscy Chartcrmongering. 1875 1 29" (I989) 49 jour al q/ Ecorni*o
Hislor
677; K Heine and W Kerber, "European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path
Dependence" (2002) 13 Euo/eaoiJeurnia oJ L aoid Eio ths 47, 54 55 (viexing tliC hi-anchisc tax
as consideration for the permission of trusts).
27 Kahan and Karna; suipra n 22, 73 I; Roe, saq/a n 25, 60 10.
2
Grand), nira n 26, 689; Kalan and Kamar, ,ira n 22; Roe, nira n 25, 610.
2
Eg Cary, sqro n 13, 664; Drury, spro n 25, 7 8.
1( Delaware's market share even increased from 35% in 1965 to 40% in 1973 and reached about
50% in 2000. Sce Subramanian, suqro n 18, 1804.
11 CT L Enriques, 'C Company Law and the Fears of a European Delaware" (20()4) 15 Eimop aln
Busioess Jo Reiie, 1259, 1269 (arguing that iexw "product innovations" in corporate law arC
axailable today); TH Tr6ger, "Choice of Jurisdiction in Luropean Corporate Law: Perspec:tives on
European Corporate Governance" (200.5) 6 Euopeoi Buisiness Oraniaolioti Low Re ie 3, 43
(speaking of a "historic al singularity").
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2. Network Externalities and (Purportedly) good Delaware Law
(a) Delaware
Delaware's competitive advantages are said to result from network externalities,
stemming from the use of the Delaware product by a large number of
purchasers.12 The Delaware Chancery Court and Supreme Court largely
specialise in corporate law," and are noted for the absence of a jury trial 4 and
their speedy judicial process."
Specialisation which requires a critical mass of registered corporations allows for the purported good substantive quality of Delaware law.
Whether one considers Delaware's law beneficial to shareholders or not,
regulatory competition has led US corporate law away from a regulatory
approach."'b Delaware may not usually have been the leading innovator, but it
was always a quick adopter of innovations.3 This goes with another network
externality, the sheer mass of its case law. One of the arguments for Delaware's
lead, besides the judges' good understanding of the needs of business practice, is
predictability, resulting from many decisions having been made in the past."3
(b) The Large Vem ber States' Edge in Substantive Law
For an EU or EEA Member State to become a European Delaware, it would
have to offer similar advantages. Originally, only a few, albeit important,
legislation issues may have given Delaware the decisive edge over New Jersey
but today the case law, which has had time to mature both quantitatively and
qualitatively is its advantage, for which the large number of Delaware
corporations have provided a sufficient number of disputes. Other states, with a
smaller number of corporations, would be virtually unable to catch up, as the

12C

MI Klausmuer, "Corporations, Corporate Law and Networks of Contracts" (1995' 81
Low Reiew 757, 772; Bchuk and Harndani, spra n 20, 586 88.

1- Romano, .u/t

i

n 12, 39 40; BS Black, "Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
[Iii
lira, Retiew 542, 589 91; Kahan and Karnai. sura n 22,

Analysis" (1990) 84 ,Vrihweser

708.

4 Kahan and Karnar; supro n 22, 708; Roe, supro n 25, 594.
Eg Black, vula n 33, 590. Sometimes it takes only weeks or montls to get the preliminary
iiunction decided on, which can be crucial in a takeover battle.
11 Winter, usa n 12, 25 55; JR Ma ey and G' Miller, "loward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporatc Law" (1987) 65 Texas Lw Reiew 469, 484 86.
17 Romano, u/ra n 12, 9; f Car, ulra n 13, 668; Romano, u/ra ii 19, 240.
Romano, supra n 12, 39; Romano, supro n 19, 250; but see Black, supra n 33, 589 (atguing that
large states have an equally developed case law or would be able to develop it quiMy); E Kamnar,
'A Regulatory Compe(ition Theory o" Indeterminacy in Corporate Law" (1998) 98 (olambia Latw
Reriew* 1908, 1913 23, 1939 10; Bebchuk and I errell, vula n 17, 1190 91; Bebchluk and
Harndani, supra n 20, 601 4 (all arguing that tie indlerminacy of' Delaware law craes income
for the bar).
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number of legal disputes is certain to be much smaller. ' Thus, the development
of attractive substantive law usually requires a long-term evolutionary process,
which leaves some leeway for trial and error over time.
As a general matter, a developed corporate law should be a competitive
advantage. Admittedly, statutory law that is perceived to be attractive could be
copied with relative ease, translation problems aside. However, both in common
law and civilian jurisdictions, the crucial issue is how that law is put into effect in
practice. One should not rashly conclude that common law jurisdictions have an
inherent advantage in providing a better developed body of law.4 " Even without
a formal doctrine of stare decisis, civilian courts cannot merely apply legal codes
without learning from experience and displaying certain patterns of consistency
12
in their interpretation of the law. In general, and particularly in corporate law,
precedent and judge-made law are also of considerable practical importance in
continental European jurisdictions. A related factor in many civil law jurisdictions is doctrinal work by legal academics, which influences courts to some
degree. 1"
Again, the development of case law and experience with applying statutory
rules is a matter of trial, error and evolution. What degree of development and
experience can be reached will depend on characteristics of the particular state,
the sophistication of its courts and legal academics. Most of all, legal systems
that have to deal with a larger number of cases are better positioned to reach a
higher level of development more quickly
Other than just copying a statute, the development of a corporate law system
in that sense cannot easily be transplanted. Conside, for example, Austrian
jurists working in corporate and commercial law, and Austrian courts deciding in
that field who, as a matter of practice, regularly absorb German case law and
scholarship as the corporate and commercial laws of the two countries are very
similar. Issues are often raised much earlier in a larger legal system, whereas
certain fact patterns and disputes may not yet have come to pass in a smaller one,

Kahan and Karnai; supra n 22, 725 26.
SCfJ Armour, "Who Should Make Corporate Laxw LIU Legislation versus Regulator
Competition" (2005) 48 C rrn Lea Probms, available alhttp:/ / ssi.co/inabsra-t-75720.5, 53,

22 (arguihg that UKJudges' ieference to precedent may be ome an advantage for the UK).
On he rol o1"precedent in civil lawx jurisdictions see, eg R Da\ id, "Sources o" Lax", in R David,
A,,t ratioal L y lopvdia (I'Copauti7( Liaw, lo 11: Ihe 1, -,
oal s,
q/t"tI Ior/d am thIr (,omparisou
and
icalion
W'1 Tbingen, Moh, 1984), 116 19; At Lasse, "Judicial (Sell )Portraits: Judicial
Discoune in the French Legal System" (1995) 104 ale Lalovoun al 132514 10; C Baudenbac:her,
"Some Remarks on ihe Method of Civil Lawx"(1999) 34 Texas Janeroaiioal Lau J7ornal 333,
319 56.
12 An example that has gained some ineirnational altention is (imeGerman Ho! ma//er doctrine. See,
eg Al Ldbbe, "Corporate Groups: Competences of the Shareholders' Meeting and Minority
Protection the German Federal Cour o.Justices recent G(rliaeand Alhcroiroa Cases Redefine
the lo aniller Doctrihe" (2004) 5 German Lw ajional 1057 79.
1- See gencraly David, spra n 41, 143 44.
I
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even though they are important when they finally do. In that, the Austrian
corporate lawyer's perspective on German corporate case law and academic
writing resembles the approach of the courts of other US states to the ones in
Delaware, whose decisions often provide persuasive authority. However, even
though transplantation of German doctrines to Austria does take place, Austrian
corporate law usually lags behind.
In view of the firmly entrenched and well-developed corporate law traditions
in EU Member States, no single one among them should be able to provide a
better developed case law as a competitive advantage to start with. In particular,
those states with the smallest population and total economic output, which
should in theory have the best financial incentives to enter into a maximisation
of revenue from incorporations (as we shall see in Section B.3), are in the worst
starting position to develop a competitive advantage in case law, while larger
Member States, such as the UK, Germany or France, should be ready to leap
ahead. Without at the same time also catching up in the number of firms, a
smaller state would not normally be able to capture a market niche by providing
highly developed case law.
Conceivably the overall assessment of the persons deciding about the state of
incorporation of the particular case law may also be negative, in which case a
judicial clean slate would actually be an advantage. An example could be the
German doctrine of equity substitution (Eigetkapitalersatz),which provides for the
subordination of loans given by shareholder to companies in times of crisis in
order to protect creditors. It was originally developed by the courts, but is today
often criticised as overregulation." When New Jersey and Delaware fought for
predominance in US corporate law in the early twentieth century, the case laws
of US states were not quite as developed as today's European legal traditions and
corporate governance structures, and were closer to being a clean slate. However,
after the mass migration of firms from New Jersey, Delaware had the critical
mass of large firms to allow it to develop the case law and experience in dealing
with issues of corporate law which is today seen as one of its core advantages. By
contrast, none of Europe's diverse corporate governance traditions appears to be
endowed with both a similar number of firms and a relatively clean slate
allowing it to begin developing a system of corporate law favoured by the
I

1V Mciicke, "Die Nicdclassungsli'ciheit nach '1berscering'" (2003) 94 GtHRundsiau 793,

808-9 (using 1,,,1 cug
, as reason to argue for the abolition of the doctrine). By contrast, both
Ausu'ia (Btndcgescz tber Eigenkapilal cisczendc GcscllschalicrIcistungcn (Eigcnkapilalcr-salzGesetz EKEG, Art I Gesellschafts- und lnisolvetizre htstind(erunlgsgesetz 200 GIRAG 200)3,
BGBI 1 2003/92) and lhaly (Codiec Civilc, Ar 2467, 2497quinquics, innroduccd by the law of'
17 January 2003, Gazzetta Ufliciale no 17, Supplernento Ordinario) have recentty enacted
staluies on this issue. For a cirtnal economic analysis of subordinaion and a brief conparaliv
overview, see 1\1 Gelter, "The Subordination of Shareholder Loans in Bankruptcy" (2005)
Harvard John M. Olin Coerir Law, Economics, and Business Fellow s' Discussion Paper Scries
4, available at itt://xvwi.awhararui.eui/programs/olin
-enter/fellows-papers/I-(Gelter.php,
accessed on 28.Jtly 2005.
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market. It is more likely that a large country (which starts out with a lot of firms)
could have some success if the law it already has is considered favourable by
those who are deciding where to incorporate.
(c) Will Legal ProcedureBecome an ImportantFactor in Competition?
A similar point can also be made with respect to legal procedure. Within
Europe, there are certainly considerable differences between the different
national court systems, regarding both expertise and speed in decision making.
Appeals and preliminary rulings of the ECJ may delay procedures for many
years. However, the presence of juries as a factor of uncertainty in corporate
law, as it may sometimes be in the US outside Delaware, is unimportant in
Europe. It also seems unlikely that the specialisation of judges will give any
state a competitixe edge. Here, too, the advantages should normally be on the
side of larger Member States, where a larger number of cases will facilitate
specialisation.
Advantages both in substantixve law and in the efficiency of the judicial
process can only fully come to bear when there is little doubt in which court a
corporate dispute will be litigated. Even in the US, derivatixve suits are not always
brought in the state of incorporation.4 5 Most of all, diversity jurisdiction allows
4
disputes between citizens of different states to be brought in the federal courts,
which will then adjudicate on the basis of the state law applicable in the
particular case. 4 1 Still, where the case for xenue in another state could be made,
suits are typically brought in Delaware itself48 The reasons usually given for this
are the known adxvantages of the Delaware courts, but also the expectation of
attorneys to receive contingency fees. 49 Furthermore, according to an explicit
proxvision of Delaware law, every nonresident person accepting a director's
position in a Delaware corporation is deemed to have consented to the Delaware
5
courts' jurisdiction. 0
1 Macey and Mliller, u/ra n 36, 491-95.
46 US Constitution, Ar 1I,
s 2; sec, cg AT von Mchrcn, La

i Ie [S- A (etera! and (omparalite Vew

(Deventer, Kluxwer, 1988,, 41 50; S Grissom, "DiversityJurisdiction: Ai Open Dialogue in Dual
Sov-eignty" (2001) 24 Hamic Lx Revie 372; DL Bassctt, "The Hidden Bias in Diversity
Jurisdiction" (2003) 81 1ha livto Il,)
La, Quartoty 119.
47 Erie RR v Tonpiums, 3(4 US 4 I (938 linding that state 1awNaplics). According to the internal

aflairs doctrie, the Jaw of the state of incorporation applies to disputes within the company
'including those bctw~ccn shareholders and dir-etors). Eg Rcstac mnt (Second) of Conflict of
Laws, s302, bt.

\1" oal (it Baftk

cf' Amh v 1nrpar 17,nancal Sae
r

R:oPa
a
aa el Coen:io ]xt riorde

ba, 462 US 611, 621 (1983);

, 500 US 90 106 ( 1991); sec M\accy and Mille supra n 36,
195; Carne, Ula n 11, 313; Kersting,
t
im n 11, 2 11; Kieninger, nira ii 11, 107; S Lombardo,
"Conflict of Law Rules in Company Laaw altr I bnrscering: An Economic and Comparative
Analysis of the location of Policy Competence in the European Union (2003, 4 Etop an
Busiaess Oriagdalioti Lrau Reziewa
301, 312 13.
18 Macey and

Miller,_uia n 36, 196; -f Rornano, nina n 12, 1.

49 Maccy and Millc; supra n 36, 497.
50 10 Delaware Code, s 3114.
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Jurisdiction might have a different impact in Europe. Under Article 60 of the
"Brussels-I Regulation" on jurisdiction," a legal person is domiciled and hence
may be sued (Article 2) in the Member State where it has (a) its statutory seat, (b)
its central administration or (c) its principal place of business. Thus, corporations
may, in extreme cases, be sued in one of three states.> However, Article 22(2)
provides an exception to this rule, according to which
"inproceedings which have as their object the validity of the constitution, the nullity or
the dissolution of companies or other legal persons or associations of natural or legal
persons, or of the validity of the decisions of their organs, the courts of the Member
State in which the company, legal person or association has its seat..."

have exclusive jurisdiction. In order to determine the location of the corporate
"seat", the regulation points to the respective rules of private international law.
Since the regulation does not purport to harmonise that field, " it is by no means
clear that this will always be the state of incorporation. Article 22 also applies to
lawsuits challenging the legality of shareholder decisions," which includes, for
example, the German AnJechtirngsklage (suit challenging shareholder decisions for
their validity), ' - which is frequently sought as a battleground for corporate law
disputes by minority shareholders. In the case of out-of-state companies, such
proceedings may not necessarily be held in the state of incorporation. By
contrast, jurisdiction over suits against directors or shareholders is determined by

51 Regulation 44/2001 EC [2001] QJ 1,12/1. Generall) the regulation applies only to "civil

or commercial matters" (Art 1(1)).
Thus, it may not apply to disputes for company registers. In
a dillrcnlt
cottex, that EQCJ Iound (hat Geman and Austriai courts were acting in a
non-uditial ffilction when actng in there function asregisters. Case C 86/00 110 II'ohnbaa
[2001] ECR 5353; Case ( 182/00 ulz GnbH and Oh/im [2002] ECR 00547 (EQJ dismissing
requests for prelirninar) opinions Cf G Eckert, "Internationale Zustndigkeit nach der
',
EuGV\ 0 bei Kapilalgcscllschaltn"(203) 14 ecolex 76, 78;R HfBtege, 'Atr 61 EuG 7()'
in
H Thomuas and H Putzo (eds),
1it
-ii/fizec orijun, nt G
(/if:
;~ et, eEinfuln
Lten iwhg
und europarluiuellen VrslhriJeoi (ETG I, FieVO, ZuIseluigsV, ZuI(, 11A1(r) (1inchein,Beck,
25th edn, 2003,, para 11.
52 Kersting, sa~r n I , 47.
Cf Roth, piva u 5,191 (criticisinig
(,
that this
reference to private international law foils the purpose
of harmonisation); Ramm loo, sapra n 3, 39 ("the c\crlasting Itrc(h \\ar bwc Cen the

'inicorporation' theory and the 'real seat' theory reappears at the level
of international
comfpeece"). The E( J in Lberseeritg does not explicitly require EU M[cinber States to
have specific
conflict
of laws rules, but only to recognise legal capacity. Even UK private
itlteratiotal law does 11o exclusiv rely on incorporation: according to (200 1)SI 2001/3929,
sell 1, para 10, a company has its
seat
in the UK if "it
was ilcorporated or formed under the
law of a par( of the United Kingdom", or i' ''its central management and couol is exercised in
the Uited Kingdom". See L Colin>, A Briggs, J Hill, JD NLean and CG M1orse, Dicqg and
Alorris
on lle
Cotjlicl
oJ Laws (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 13th ccli, 4th suppl, 2004), ss 11-060,
S 11-36.
51,1Kropholle1 Taropaisc/de ZivilproeffIreuIl
(Heidclbcrg,NCrlag Rccht und l\Virtschall,
7th ccl, 2002),
Art 22, para 39; Hiiltege, u/ia n 51, para 11.
5 German Aktiengesctz, ss 243 55.
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those persons' own domicile (Article 2 ),"' which will often not be the state of
incorporation. As a result, it seems likely that courts beside the ones of the state
of incorporation will have to decide on the interpretation of corporate law in
more cases than in the US.
At present, the courts of no particular Member State seem to have a clear
competitiv e advantage.
The interests of the parties involved can vary
considerably; for example, small shareholders might be interested in bringing suit
in their own home state, if the company is also active there, instead of relying on
the courts of the state of incorporation; lawsuits out of state may result in
considerable costs."' Moreover, one could imagine that (in particular large)
corporations will attempt to avoid uncertainty with respect to jurisdiction by
including arbitration clauses in their corporate charter,"' as far as permitted by
the applicable national law.' 0
Still, it is theoretically conceivable for a Member State to combine the
supply of a favourable corporate law with the adxvantage of a speedy trial.
Again, the better starting position should lie with larger Member States, which
should be able to provide network externalities for their already large number
of corporations. For other states, any attempts to invest in the creation of
network externalities may be deterred by their costs and risks, as it is by no
means certain that a high market share will be achieved>' If uncertainties in
jurisdiction persist, and exven more so if a widespread practice of arbitration
develops, advantages in legal procedure are unlikely to become significant
factors in regulatory competition that would necessarily be "bundled" with
attractive substantive law.

Kropholler, ufra n 5, Art 22, para 40; Eckert, n/ia n 51, 80.
Enriqucs upra n 31, 1271 (staling (ha not even the UK has judges "even laintly
as specialized
and reliable"); but seeArmo urtifra n 10, s 3, 22 (arguing that the UK isthe only EU Member

State \wilh
aspcialisl
corporatc
law court).
S M\laul and C Sc:hmidt, "Inspire Art Quo vadis Sitztheorie?" (2003 58)Bettic4, 10, 2297,
2299; Trge, sapra n 3 1 24. By contrasi, ie stale of' incorporation will
normally be able to
provide a faster decision, asit its
own courts will be more familiar xwith
its
law
-1Sc9 c C Kirchne, RW Painter and I\\
Kaal, "Rgulaiory Compeiion in EU Corporaic
Lawx After Inspire Art: Unbunlig Delaware's Product for Europe", (2004) University of llHinois
Law and Economics Research Paper No LE04-001, available al hlip://ssni.com/
abstract-617681, 4 019 (arguing that it would be beneficial to "unbundle" procedural law from
corporae law).
For
c0 example, arbitration is considered problematic for lawsuits challenging the validity
of
shareholder decisions in German law See (German) Bundcsgcrihishol. 29 March 1996, 11 ZR
61

124/95, (1997) 132 ELtsc/cduuoc 4 Bin
CI Bcbchuk and Hamdani, sapra n 2,

ic/ethoJs in ciic, nn(BGILD278 90.
ela!,upra n 59, 21 22 (discussing

588; Kirchncr

recoupment of investments in attractive corporate law).
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3. Supply-side Economic Incentives
(a) A Iotivationfor Competition
In the US debate, the motivation why decision makers should be interested in a
large number of incorporations, instead of promoting their own economic
policy, is quite clean. American literature usually states two factors which make a
large number of incorporations seem desirable for a state, those being fees, most
of all franchise taxes, and business opportunities for the local bar. The incentives
created by these are a prerequisite of regulatory competition and thus of a race
in any direction.
(b) Hypothetical European Franchise Taxes
Delaware's franchise tax) makes up, in conjunction with incorporation fees,
15 20% of the state budget."' It is usually considered the main economic
incentive, making the state almost totally dependent on the incorporation
business and thus on the advantages it offers. At the same time, Delaware is the
only state imposing a franchise tax of more than a nominal amount and
receiving significant total rev7enue from it,64 both of which is the result of its
de-facto monopoly." The reason why Delaware's incentive structure works is its
small size and insignificant economic power."" Naturally, this gives corporate
lobbyists an edge over other interest groups.
By contrast, in Europe a franchise tax would run afoul of the Directive on
Indirect Taxes on the Raising of Capital."' It allows the Member State to impose
a tax on the raising of capital of companies whose effective centre of
management is located on its territory (Article 2). Article 10(c) prohibits taxes
and charges, "inrespect of registration or any other formality required before
2

6

The tax iscollected annually, with the anount depending on the number of authorised shares,

o1

corporat assets and atithorised capial. On(hie calculation of tie Lax base, see8 Delawvare Code,
s 503.
Roe, supra n 25,594; Drury, suprn 25, 9. For a detailed overvie on tlieamount o' tax revenue
collected since 1960, see Romano, ./ia n 12, 7 8.

61 Tie annual amount ranges Iiom US $3.5
io

US $ 165,000.

61 In the rest of the UJS, 45 states
only have either a low fee, which isindependent from the
company's size,a tax depending on the anotint of'the lirim's business activity
in tie state or both,
including those states which are by some consitered Delaware's main( compettors. Kalian and

Kamar supra n 22, 687 93;

e"Bebhuk and Haindani, supra n 20, 576 77. Usually, an

inc:orporation in Delaware isthus considerably more expensive than in the home state(Romano,

spra n 19, 257).
66 CfRomano, ,/ia

in 19, 239 (fnding a correlation between the speed of adopting new corporate
law innovations and lianchise tax as a percentage of the states total tax reenuc). But see Kahan
and Kamar, suia n 22, 700 n 64.

o7

Directive 69/335 EEC [1969] ,JL249/25; el"H MCrkt, "Das Europaisec Gscllschaltisrch
und (tie
hdee des '\Vettbewerbs der Gesetzgeber'" (1995) 59 Raet Zeittdiuift fiir
atnlindd, ,nd
murnainales Priraire&i545, 565 )ointing out that neithCr Germany\ the UK nor the Netherilands
impose such taxes).
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the commencement of business to which a company, firm, association or legal
person operating for profit may be subject by reason of its legal form".
According to the ECJ, this prohibition also covers fees which are imposed on an
annual basis."' Income from corporate tax cannot provide an equivalent
incentive either as tax treaties normally provide for taxation of business profits in
the state where the enterprise has a permanent establishment." Furthermore,
residence within the meaning of tax treaties is normally determined by the place
of effective management. °
One should not rush into the conclusion that a legislatixve removal of the
franchise tax by European law would create a strong incentive for EU Member
States to compete for charters." Delaware only receives more than nominal
revenues from franchise tax because of its pre-existing monopoly position and
advantages. Any other state would risk a loss of many firms by imposing such a
large fee."2 By contrast, no single EU Member State has a remotely comparable
monopolistic position or competitixve advantage. Logically, such a position is
necessary to create a sufficient incentive to create a corporate law suited to the
needs of the target group in the first place, most of all to overcome political
resistance." 'Vithout the incentive, there is no monopoly rent; without the
monopoly, there is little incentixve, and the chances of oxvercoming this by a large
one-time investment are small and remote. Hence, if no historic accident as
came to pass in Delaware brings a European state into a similar position,
budgetary incentixves for the creation of a European Delaware are absent. If any
state should try to create them by imposing similarly high franchise taxes, this
would be very detrimental to attracting incorporations and would thus destroy
any competitixve advantage. Even if the Directive on Taxes on the Raising of
Capital were repealed, a similar incentixve effect would remain highly unlikely

U

C
C-71/91 and C 179/91 Polete (,ani SpA and (nismdau (,otr;iobi SCA Ammih tone
(sie
dcic FaT c,-dcto Stabo[1993] ECR 1915; Case C 188/95 Talas A /S ea h daIuslr
cl
(Eueei mii(te)
,
119971 ECR 6783. Art 12 of the directive lists
permissible exc:eptions.
( "OECD Model Cocnxenion with Respect to Taxes on lIncmec
and on Capital, Art 7; c"
BR Cheffins, (,ompa1p
bia.I heo);Stru
ih and 0o/ation (Oxford U niversity Press 1997), 135 36
arguing (hat tax revenue would no (create a signilicant incentive in the UK unless companies also
physically relocate there); Tr6ger, ufiva n 31, 16 (speaking of an "unwarranted concern" that
incorporaion choices could bc alk(c ci by corporate tax).

7 OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Art 1(3,;f
Kieninge suipra n I I 185; JC Damnann, 'A New Approach to Corporate Choice of' Law"
(2005)38 1daherhilt ornal of ian
sntiotal lan' 1, 717 2.
71 ContraJC Damnann, "'ieedon ol Choice in European Corporatc Law" (2004)29 leJourial
9/"lternational
Lo. 477, 521, 524-33.
72 CTrogei; suipran 31, 19.
73 CfKahan and Kanar, u/ ia n 22, 728-35 (discusshlg political
resistance in the American context);
btit see Grundtnann, supra n I I 795 96 (discussing Europe and expccting incentives already
because of minimal tax eflebts and other factors such asprestige;
however, one could counter this
argutnent by pointing out that in any European CoUntty. politicalt rcsistance is likely
to be ftich
greater than in Delaware).
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(c) Advisory Business
The incorporation of a large number of firms also creates a lot of income
potential for Delaware's small, but influential bar. 4 Advisory activity related to
incorporations reportedly accounts for about $167 million of additional
income. The close personal association between members of the legislature, the
judiciary and the bar is said to create a strong alignment of interests among
decision makers within the state; 7 ' other than larger states with significant
industry, Delaware lacks local interest groups such as unions or companies which
are important employers 77 and which could push policy making into another
direction. On top of this, Delaware is not home to many shareholders, for which
reason some scholars argue that voter preferences do not force legislators to
implement a shareholder-friendly corporate law.7 ' The maintenance of its
current line of policy thus seems assured. Exen if legislators and judges do not
reap the full benefits accruing to the state and its bar,79 legislators are subject to
pressures from lobbies, and judges may (at least to some degree) be kept in line by
the threat of statutory regulation limiting their freedom of choice in
adjudication.8 0
It has been suggested that professional organisations of lawyers and
accountants in the UK (the latter in xview of the requirement of UK companies
to conform to UK GAAP in their financial statements)' or lawyers in other
European countries112 might lobby for making the respective company law
attractive to foreign incorporators. This kind of economic incentive seems more
plausible than a hypothetical franchise tax. However, the relative economic
importance of the Delaware corporate law is disproportionately large. Still, it is
rather small if put into a broader perspective: the total amount of additional
revenue for lawyers in that state does not even reach the gross rexvenue of a single
large New York law firm."3 Admittedly, Delaware firms face competition from
national law firms, 4 while legal education and languages still provide for a strong

74 Cf Macey and Millert;ifpa n 36, 36- 87.
75 Kahan and Karna; supra n 22, 697.
7' This was noted already by Cary, ura n 13, 690 92; but see Mlacey and Miller, u/a 1,36, 492 91.
,pointing out revenue by investment bankers and non-Delaware lawyers).
77 Roe, tipra n 25, 594.

supra n 13, 1452.
Easterbrook and lischel, .simin 12, 217.
Black, supra n 33, 584. The case of' Sniih t tan Gorkorn, 488 A 2d 858 (Del 1985) is paictulaly

71 Bcbhuk,
8

notable, as which is an unusual outcome in Delaware directors were ordered to pay damages
in spie o" die businessjudgncrt rule (Allen and Kraakrnan, supra n 19, 254). A legislative change
followed promptl, allowing companies to opt out of a judicial review of duty of (care (DGCL
s 102(b)(7)).
81 Cheffins, /upran 69, 437- 38; Armour
pra n 40, s 3, 31.
82 Darnnann, supra n 71, 522 23.
83 Kahan and Kamar, ura n 22, 697 98.
4
1 Daines, supra n 21, 158
86; Enriques, supra n 31, 1264.
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separation of European legal markets,"' which may make a large number of
incorporations attractive to the respectiv e bar associations. However, as with
respect to franchise taxes, for such incentives to make a really large impact that is
sure to surpass the interests of other groups in most European states, especially
larger ones, a Delaware-style monopoly position will probably be necessary. " For
a business location such as the UK, exven this is not plausible. Although the
possibility that it will become UK policy to encourage incorporations of foreign
businesses cannot be ruled out,"' the UK will thus lack the economic incentives
to be as responsive as Delaware to the interests of the groups deciding on
88
incorporations.
4. Smali States and Microstates vs the UK
Which state could become Europe's preferred site for incorporations in the long
run? In spite of all the considerations, at the moment one might actually think
that British prixvate limited companies were often preferred to companies in other
states, such as the German Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung (GmbH). In
addition to the fact that the ECJ's opinions in Centros and Inspire Art arose from
disputes over companies incorporated in England and Wales, there are reports
about sharp increases in the numbers of English companies being set up with the
purpose of doing business in Germany 8 9 Also, companies formed in the UK
have been known to gain popularity in the Netherlands.'
One reason that is often cited for the attractiveness of the UK is the lack of a
minimum legal capital requirement for private limited companies,"' since the
Second EU Directive ' 2 does not apply to this type of corporation."' The British
85 But see Easterbrook and lische-l,

Ira n 12, 217 n 8 (pointing out that out-of-state lawers are

Permitted to represent Delawvare corporations and to take residence and practice tmre). In
Europe, it seerns equaly likely that the economic incentive to create a source of inc:ome for the
local bar will decrease with an increasing 1ransnational integration o" lawv lirIs.
a Cf Kahan and Karnar, suia n 22, 698 (estimating additional revenue to law)crs from
incorporations in US states o(her than Delaware).
87 S Deakin, "Regulatory Competition versus Harmonization in European Company Law", in DC
Esty and D Geradin (ecs), R,_aaor Compaewion and Fcoomic IArala: (ConparalirePRaplis
(Oxford University Press, 2001), 190, 205.
I Armou,
\t
supra n 40, s 3, 31 (suggesting that London law lit ns may become an inIluenlial
interest grout) in the development of UK corporate law).
8 See H Hirte, "Wettbecierb der Rehtsorditingen nach 'Inspire At': Atieh das
Beurkundungserfordernis fir GnbH-Anteilsibertragungen steht zur Disposition" (2003) 91
GnbH Ruads/au R 421;.J Kleinert and P Probs(,"Endguhiges Ats Ftur Sonderankntipltngen hei
(Schei-)Austaabsgeselsc haften" (2003) 56 Der Betried 2217, 2218 n 10; f Kieninger, .tira n 11,
172; Halbhubei supra n 14, 1403 (considering England a "candidate ci a European Delaware").
9o LooijestiinClearie, suirain 10, 397; De Kluive rfuia n 10, 122-24 (discussing Dutch companies
inoxitg into UK law).
91 See, eg P Kindler, 'Auf dem
g zur Europiischen Brietkastengesel schaft?"' (2003 36 \ee
7urislishe lI(IheschriJ! 1073, 1078 (2013).

92 Second Company Lax Directive 77/91 EEC 119771 OJ L26/1.
1- Second Directive, Ar 1.
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approach can be described as "lax" or "liberal" (depending on the perspective),
and UK courts enjoy a high reputation."' However, with minimum capital
requirements and formalities being subject to a discussion on the European level
and undergoing reform in xvarious Member States,"' those factors alone probably
will not create permanent competitive adxvantages for the UK."'
One of the cornerstones of the American debate is the small size and
economic power of Delaware and the lack of opposed interest groups resulting
from this, which are seen as an essential requirement for the strength of
economic incentixves to provide corporate law tailored to the "needs of the
market".' 8 It seems reasonable to assume that law makers generally have an
incentive to increase franchise tax revenues if it helps to secure their political
success," which will be diminished if it is fairly unimportant relatixve to the
revenue of other taxes and to the influence of other groups with a stake in
corporate law. In a country such as the UK, which is itself an important business
location, it is safe to assume that the impact of franchise tax rev7enues on
re-election prospects would be minute.'"
Howe er, other states could step in. Just comparing population size,""
Delaware is larger than the founding EU Member State of Luxembourg and the
new members Malta and Cyprus. A larger number of small EU states compares
in terms of GDP Moreover, as the Freedom of Establishment also applies within
the European Economic Area (EEA),' 02 the smaller nations of Iceland and

91

CJhCllins, supra
n 69, 440 43; Michelcir supra n 6,529.

91 JA Mc Cahery and EP Verneulen, "Limited Partnership Reform in the U nited Kingdom: A
Competitivc N cnturc Capital Oricntcd Busincss Formn" (2004) TILEC Discussion Paper DP
2001-024, 20.
11 For cxamplc, France rccently rcducd miniumf capital to E I in the So(ciuk
a Respo'nsabililu Linile
°
(hIRL) and has :onsiderably deregulated the proc:ess
of setting up a company. See Loi n
0
2003-721 du Ier aout 2003 pour l'initiativ Cconomiquc,
Journal olficicl
n 179 du 5.8. 2003,
1319, Art 1. Similar legislation has been introduc ed in Spain. See E1 Kieninger, "The Legal
Famcwork of Regulatory Competition Bascd on Company Mobility: EU and US Comparcd"
(20011 6 Germnm bi, Joutrnal 711, 768. The German M1inistr) of Justice
has rec:ently
released
a proposal (o reduce miniitiim capital loi German (GmbHs Ii-om
E25,W0 (o E10,000. Tniuarj
eine (;P.etze.
zr \nregeltvg des
Iid tkital der Gmbl ( lule1t1ap9, available at
hitpx://wx\.bmj.dc/mncdia/aichi\c\/908.1pdl accessed 28 May 2005.
97 Armour, ;fra n 10.
" See, cg Bcchuk, supra n 13, 1452.
9 But seeG Hadfield and E lTalley, "On Public versus Private Provision of Corporate Law" (2004)
USC CLEO Research Paper No C04-13, available at http://ssrn.coi/abstiac-5-064, 11 15
(assuming that legislators' private benefits decrease after a certain point).
1 See also D Charny, "Competition among.Jtiiisdic(ions in Formulating Corporatc laaw Rules: An
American Perspective on the 'Race to the Bottom' in the European Communities" (1991) 32
hInileonal oua
wJournal 423, 447 (no( sceing a dangcr of a race to (he bottom in larger EU
member states);
Kieninger, nlra n 96, 758 59.
According to ihccensus of 92W0, Delawvare has a population of 783,600; sec US Census Bureau,
http://fa-tfiniercenrsus.gox/tf/langenxti nameDE(,2000_PLU_-Q1'PLgeo-i(-J04000
US 10.html, accessed on 9 May 2003.
1112
EEA 'leaty, Arts 31 and 31.
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Liechtenstein enter the scene. In principle, it is thus easy to find eligible
candidates.'0 3
One important objection is that sovereign states in Europe retain broader
authority over taxes than US states. The total tax revenue of a soxvereign
European nation is larger than in a US state of comparable population. Even for
Luxembourg to obtain the same proportion of tax revenue from incorporation
business (which it cannot because of the prohibition), it would have to exceed
Delaware's rexvenue by a factor of three in absolute numbers. 104 The same
marginal tax revenue should thus be of much smaller oxverall importance when it
is weighed against other policy concerns.
For example, Exva-Maria Kieninger has pointed out that Liechtenstein, as an
EEA member, is not subject to the Directixve on Indirect Taxes on the Raising of
Capital,"" and that it in fact imposes a special tax of 0.1% of net assets (or a
minimum of 1000 Swiss francs) on legal entities registered in the principality.'°O
Between 1995 and 1998, rexvenues from that tax amounted to 15 20% of total
tax revenue.
Thus, if Liechtenstein actixely promotes its qualities as a possible
site of incorporation for public companies, it might in theory become the state
closest to the competitive structure of Delaware.'() Howexer, Liechtenstein's
current advantage seems to be largely based on its character as a tax haven,
while no particular adxantages in corporate law are visible.'()" Furthermore, the
proportion of total tax rexenue has decreased significantly since 1985."'( The
prospects of a "Liechtenstein effect" are thus still uncertain.
5. Conclusion
The analysis of the supply side in the European market should lead us to the
conclusion that the likelihood of a European Delaware is very small. Even
assuming away the EU law prohibition of a franchise tax, significant incentives
for any state to cater to the market are unlikely to dexvelop, as possible advantages
remain small relative to total tax rexvenue and thus too small to overcome
countervailing political interests. Moreo7er, in order to benefit from
incorporations, a state would have to establish a quasi monopolistic position in
the market. The reason why Delaware could obtain such a position is found in
the economic history of the US, which is unlikely to be repeated in Europe.

103 See alsoM1Calhery and Vermneulen, niva n 9,5,
22.

1 Kicningi; supra n 3, 19I.

10EEA lreat), Art 40, annex XII; d Kieninger,, ura n 11, 188; Kieninger u/ia n 96, 7 55.
(,csctz
uibir
die landces- und Gcrncindcstcucrn (Svueirgscez) vir 30.1.
196I, LGB1 1961/7,
Art 81.
107
Kicningi; sa/pra n 11,
187.
10But se 'lr6ger hlra n 31, 21 n 63.
Jbid
at69.
Kienhrger, ,s/an 11, 187 (showing adecrease from 26.6% in 1985 to LITl% in 1998).
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THE DEMAND SIDE: THE DEVELOPING PRODUCT AND ITS PURCHASERS

1. Impediments to Market Development
The market for corporate law in Europe differs markedly from the one in the US
not only on the supply side, but also with respect to demand. The most obvious
differences are language barriers and a lack of familiarity of members of the
legal profession with the law of other Member States;111 another is the
requirement to comply with accounting standards of the state of incorporation.
English-speaking jurisdictions may have an edge because their language is widely
understood, making their law more easily accessible; 112 however, one could also
imagine the development of various submarkets of states sharing the same
language and related legal traditions, such as German-speaking or Frenchspeaking countries. Still, both the cost of decision makers to inform themselves
about foreign law will often exceed the expected value of the advantages of an
out-of-state incorporation; decision makers might decide to remain "rationally
ignorant".113 Competition might also be impeded by a widespread sentiment of
suspicion about "pseudo-foreign" corporations, which could result in additional
risk penalties when taking on debt.
Another factor could be differences in legal traditions. One might expect an
aspiring European Delaware to adopt the Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL), which could be seen as the best available law (at least in terms of
guaranteeing incorporations), having successfully undergone the test of
regulatory competition. In theory, it could be enacted by European states as far
as allowed by European directives. However, the DGCL, as a common law
statute, is not designed as a comprehensive code, but leaves core issues such as
fiduciary duties largely to the courts. Certain mechanisms of shareholder
protection may therefore be hard to transplant. This supply-side problem aside,
even the DGCL may be less well-adapted to the demand it would meet in
Europe, given that economic, legal and cultural circumstances differ from the
ones in the US. The most efficient law for Europe or for individual countries
may require different answers.
Exogenous cultural and linguistic influences, which do not apply in the US
regulatory debate, are likely to reduce demand for out-of-state corporate law in
Europe. In the rest of Section C I will look at two crucial differences which have
I

Heine and Kerbcr supr n 26, 62 (speaking of' stink costs of human capital cg of law\ycrs who
invested in expertise in their own law,); Kirchner etil, uafta n59, 13 (discussing costs of handing

circign law); Enriqucs, supra n 31, 1264. On cuhural and language barriers see Kicningc; siipra n
11,

171

72; M Siems, "Convergence, Competition, Centros and Conflicts of Law: European

Company LawNin (lic 2i s( Cenury" (2002), 27 Turopeaw Law Reriew 47, 54; Dammnann, supra n 71,
192 93; see also Baciier,, upra n b, 19; Maul and Schmidt, upva n 58, 2298 99.
11 Kirchner elil, supra n 59, 23; McCahicry and Vrnmctlcn, supra n 95, 20.
1 See generally GJ Stigler, "'lie Econiomics of hIformation" (1961F 69 iournal (f PoliticalEconoitg
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received little attention, but may imply markedly different results of competition
in Europe than in the US. First, the European discussion centres on different
types of companies. Secondly, different groups of persons are likely to appear as
decision makers on the demand side of the market. As shall be seen, we should
expect a smaller demand for out-of-state charters, a more fragmented market,
and probably a higher likelihood of a race (or "leisurely walk") to the bottom.
2. Competition for Incorporations of Different Types of Firms
(a) Regulatory Competition and Hewly Founded Private Corporations
While the US discussion is focused on large public corporations, in Europe, the
market for corporate law has almost exclusixvely been a concern of privately held,
newly founded corporations (if one considers the reports on increasing numbers
of incorporations in the UK with the purpose of doing business elsewhere" 14 and
the reported cases of the ECJ and national courts'"5 to be representative). So far,
mainly the founders of new firms have been interested in making use of the law
of other EU Member States.'"'
(b) High, but DecreasingCosts of CorporateLaw Arbitragefor Large Firms
Even though the ECJ has already eliminated major impediments to regulatory
competition, and even though a shift in actual business activity may often be
effectuated by creating a branch office,'" reincorporation into another law is still
wrought with difficulties. While US corporate laws typically include statutes on
reincorporations' 1 and cross-border mergers,' ' the corporate laws of countries
traditionally following the real seat theory usually do not hav e such provisions,
and sometimes exven interpret such decisions by shareholders as resolutions to
liquidate.'12 The European commission tried to remedy this with its 1997
proposal for a Directive on the Transfer of a Company's Seat,' which, howexer,
Hirtc, supra n 89, R 42 1.
Besides the ECJ cases cited in Section A. 1, see, eg Oberster Gericlitshof (Austrian Supreme

Court), 15 ,July 1'", 60b 123/99b and 6Gb 124/99z, (1999) 17 Oserrechiieics Reu/u der
17irtsdh/ift 719 199); Oberlandesgericlit Zxeibriicken, 26 March 2003, 3 W 21/03 2(J(J3) 58
Belriebs Beraler 864.
116 fKirchner et ad, u/ia n, 9, 22 23.
17N Siraubc, "Was blcibl von dc 14. (cscllschalhs cchklihcn Richtinic'?" in S Kalss, C Nowvotny
and AI Schauer ribs,
Edt Doarttag 6
ebhnlitft(Vienna, Manz, 2004,, 637, 614.
Il Eg DGC1 s 390.
1'9 DGCL ss 252, 256, 258.
I'l For a European ovcrvicwx, scc MM\Sicms, "The Emopean Directive on Cross-bordcr Mergcrs: An
International Miodel?" (2005( CobumHbia .onrnal (f Eurpean L, (lForthcoming), s 11; see also
Sorcnscn and Ncville, sapra n 9, 191 92; Kicningci sapra n 1, 148 49; Datnrnann, supra n 71,
188 89; Darnrann, uiva n 7(0, 78; Enriques,s/a 1131, 1261;
Deakin, nuia n 87, 2(03.
2 Proposal cir a Dircciv c of' ihc European Pailiancm and of the Council on ie Cross-bordci
Transtfer of Companies' Registered Offices, C01\ (1997 6002.
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presumed an identity of statutory and real seat and has now been made
redundant by the ECJ's decisions.12
Still, lawyers often manage to devise complex and costly transactions to
circumvent legal barriers.' )2 In practice, cross-border mergers seem to have
become a practical vehicle for a transfer of seat on the continent. For example,
the Austrian Supreme Court recently permitted a particular type of merger
where an Austrian company was amalgamated into its sole shareholder, a
German company.2 4 Also, there have been reports of mergers of Italian and
French companies into a German GmbH 12, and of a German GmbH into its
Austrian parent."6 A German court has asked the ECJ to issue a preliminary
ruling on whether the legal restrictions on statutory mergers to German
corporations are compatible with the freedom of establishment. 1' Even though
ECJ case law still seems to allow Member States to prohibit the "emigration" of
companies,' 28 it is probably unavoidable that the court will soon put an end to
this. In any case, the EU Council has already approved the Commission's
proposed Directive 12 9 on Cross-Border Mergers," 0 which will after approval by
the European Parliament provide for a more straightforward way of transfer of
registered office.
Member states will be unable to maintain impediments in tax law. The
Directive on the Taxation of Mergers prohibits the taxation of hidden
reserves in cross-border mergers.13 1 In the recent Lasteyrie d Saillant case, the
ECJ found that the taxation of unrealised gains, where a natural person
moved to another Member State, was not permissible under the freedom of
112Straube, suna n 117, at 643, 649.

2

Consider eg tim Daimler Chrysler merger; cf T Batims, "Coriorate Contracting around
Dete tixe Regulations: The Daimler Chrysler Case" (1999' 11L 7ournal (f Institutional and

Threlia
aonornics 1 19.
12 ObLerster Gerichtshof 20.3.2003, 6b

283/02i, (2003'21

cuthrif firIt

birts
d n hIt
1085. Mso

in ieUS,cross-border merger are fi-equently
used toenginecr a reincorporation in another state.
See, eg Subramainan, ira n 18, 1795, 1803.
125
R Dorr and G Smtkenborg, "'Going to the Chapel': Grienuberschrei ende Ehen im
Gesellschaftsrecht Die ersten transiationalen Verschielzungen nach dem nnnxG (1991)
12003),56 Der BeDrieb
647.
116 (
\Venglorz, "Die grenztiberschreitende 'Heraus'-,"erschmelzung einer deutschen
Kapialgescllschalt Und esgeht doch!" 2()4) 59 Berids Beraler
106 1.
127
Landgericht Koblenz, 16 September 2003, 4 HK.T 1/03, (2003) 91 Gnbll-RundJtau 1213.
I2Under (ie predominan inirprietation, I)ay fad permits such restrainis; seesipra
Section A.1.
129
Proposal fora Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Cross-border Mergers
of'Companies with Share Capital, presented by the Commission, November 18, 2003,
C0(112003) 703 final; for an overviewspe Siemns,sia n 120.
I'll
Eg "Cross-border Deals in (he European Union: Merger Muddle", oonil 4 December 2004,
35.
"I Directive 90/434 EEC [1990] QJ 1,225/1, 20, Ar 4(I);
see Dammann, spra n 71, 491.In (le US,
reincorporation into another state
is
normally considered a "reorganization" R(is368(a) (2004')
not giving rise
to taxation. ( Subriamanian, supra n 18, 1802. On tax impediments in Europe, see
Mleilicke, /ira n 14, 8(); 1HI Hfigel, "Steuerliche Hindernisse bei der internationalen
Sitzverlegung" (1999) 28 Zils&h flfjur Uienirais und Geselld/jisrecl
71.
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establishment.3 2 There can be little doubt that this also applies where a
company reincorporates or moves to another Member State.'11
(c) Consequences
Gixven all this, we can safely say that company law arbitrage is already becoming
easier and less costly. 4 What will it mean for the market for corporate law?
Potential consequences offered by for close corporations in the US discussion are
diverse. Some scholars have suggested that states may be specialising in different
products. The needs of Berle Means firms may be relatively homogeneous,
other than those of privately held firms.' Some scholars suggested that there
may be product specialisationl' eg for firms with large shareholders, who may
be interested in retaining more control oxver management (which is why more
legal control may be beneficial in the absence of pressure from capital
markets).' Roberta Romano argued that for public corporations, a legislative
standard template may be optimal, while the optimal arrangement for close
corporations could be assessments by judges in individual cases. 38 Ian Ayres
suggested that the high costs of an out-of-state incorporation are to blame for the
lack of competition for the charters of closed corporations, 31 which includes tax
issues, and the risks of having to litigate in another state and to comply with
Federal Securities Law. 14 Franchise tax rexenues from small companies may be
too insignificant for any state to dexvelop incentives to seriously compete for

132 Case

C 09/02 lhgh deLast)rie dui illant
, IMaete de "iottie
(not yet reported).
1
13 Eg J Kleinert and P Probst, "Endgutigs Atis fur scuerliche N\egzugsbcschtanktingen bei
natfrllichen und juristischen Personen" (2004)
17 Der Betrihe
673, 67; Trogerw
./ia i 31, 17;but
see G Paileani, "Relocation and Taxation: the European (ourt of Justice Disallowvs the French
Rule of Direct 'laxation of Unrealised Gains" (2004 1 Evolma (,ompa and inancial Lm,Ra-it,
379, 381 (wvaiting fri a legislative soluion).
13, The recently adopted European Company Statute (Regulation 2157/2001 EC [20011 Oj
1294/ 1)only allowvs reincorporation company law arbittage be tw\ecen states it' a corpora(ion is
willing to relocate itscentral administration (Art 7).See L Enriques, "Silence is Golden: The
European Company as a Catalyst lorCompany Law Arbitrage" (2004)4 J ourn al oJ Coroaile Lou)

S te 77, 80 81.
(A ]R Romano, "Stac Competition lorClose Corporation Charters: A Comment" (1992) 70
ha'huhtow tinireri Lait, QjartevtI) 409, 413; Romano, /I 11 12, 26.
RA Posner and KE Scott, Tcoiornics oj Corpoae Lox anld Securile Regulalioii (Boston,Lite Browvn &
Co, 1980', 111.
137BD Baysingel and HN Bule, "Race (1v the Bottotn \.Climb to the Top: The ALI Project and
Uniformity in Corporate Law" (1985) 10 7outna1 (f Coiforatioi
La, 131, 4 ) (Mil.This coijecture
is supported by evidence that corporations iepictiendy reincorporate in Delaware in the course of'
an IPO or another major transaction. Romano, suia i 19, 250; Lasterbrook and Fischel, u/mi in
12,216; contra Romano supra
n 19, 266 73;ec"
Mac and Miller supra n 36, 478.
'38 Romano, u/ta in12, 26 28.
"-9I Ayres, 'Judging Close Coip1rations in he Age ol"
Statutes" (1992) 71 JIshn/gloii Uiersit Lou
Qyatferi 365, 374 78.
1\[Tost itnpotantly to the Securities Act of 1933 (15 USC ss 77a 77z-3) and the Sectirities
Lxchange Act von 1931 (15 1S( ss78a 78mm.
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charters, allowing courts more latitude to implement their own ideas in corporate
law cases. 141
Assuming, for the moment, that European competition remains restricted to
new corporations, we would expect independently of whether the "race" is
going to the top or the bottom a development of law deviating from the US, as
conflicts of interest of decision makers are quite different in newly founded
corporations. First, one should expect a much more fragmented market. If
conflicts of interest between companies with various capital and ownership
structures are actually more diverse than in a market of Berle Means firms, one
would expect suppliers of corporate law to cater to those needs. Heterogeneity
4
of legal and business cultures is likely to bolster this effect.
Furthermore, even in the US, no state has achieved a near-monopoly
situation for closed corporations, as Delaware has for publicly held ones; 14 in
Europe, the costs of out-of-state incorporation are likely to be even higher,
resulting from the need to inform oneself about foreign law, potentially having to
litigate in another legal culture and having to comply with foreign accounting
standards. With relatively small stakes in newly founded firms, administrative
costs will often outweigh the benefits of out-of-state incorporation (at least when
the objective of the firm is to run a serious business), and incentives to lobby for
an improved law will be much smaller as well.
Hence, high costs of out-of-state incorporation should deter a large number
of "purchasers" from the market for out-of-state corporation law, resulting in an
exacerbated home-state bias, and thus a relatixvely low demand (corresponding to
the comparatively small supply identified in Section B). As a result, the rewards
any state can reap from tailoring its corporate law to the market will be reduced
exven more, which will further decelerate the race.
3. Controiling Interest Groups and Ownership Structures
(a)The Predominance of Large Shareholders
Independent of whether we are discussing small or large, established firms, the
direction of regulatory competition in corporate law is ultimately determined by
which persons and interest groups are in the position to create demand within
the market, i.e. who decides whether and where to reincorporate, and what
interests determine the decisions. In the US, reincorporations (to Delaware) are
normally enacted before an IPO; 4 4 at that point in time, the decision, on the one
I Ayres, /va n 139, 378.
, pra n 40, s 2,5.

142Armo

Cf Kahan and Kamnar, "Price Discrimination inthe Market for Corporate Law" (2001 816(ornell
La, RvIew 1205, 1227 (cporing that only 6% of' nonpublic corporalions arc incorporated in
Delaware).
14 CfRonano,supra n 19, 250; Easicrbrook and Fischcl, supra n 12, 216.
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hand, is arguably driven by the controllers' need to commit to a corporate law
regime which is sufficiently attractive to investors,' 45 but on the other hand is
4
potentially influenced by their interest in gaining private benefits of control. 6
In the close corporation setting discussed in the previous section, differences
from the US situation should not be all that great. In many cases, there will be a
small circle of founders, who take the company's shares and often also manage
the firm. Admittedly, the possible conflicts of interests in various firms are quite
diverse, but in many cases, the line-up will be one of arm's length bargaining
between several partners setting up a business as a common endeavour At least
initially, there will be few control problems and information asymmetries. One
should therefore think that the law only needs to provide a transactioncost-reducing template of default rules which are useful in practice and reduce
the costs of contracting.1' However, if only one of the founders manages the
firm while the others merely provide financing, there could be considerable
information asymmetries. Both in Europe and in the US, it seems unlikely that
those are resolved by regulatory competition. If the lawyer drafting the
agreement and advising where to incorporate represents the majority, which is
quite probable,141 a corporate law favouring insiders has a competitixe advantage
if future conflicts are not anticipated by the minority when the firm is initially
created. A specific country's law could thus be attractixve to new incorporations
by favouring the majority as long as this does not give it an excessively bad
reputation.
By contrast, there may be considerable differences between the US and
Europe concerning large, publicly traded corporations, where problems of
asymmetric information are exacerbated. For reasons hotly debated in the
comparative corporate goxvernance literature, 149 US and (continental) European
share ownership patterns are xvery different. In the US, an IPO usually leads to
the dexvelopment of a Berle Means structure in the long run, where a multitude
of small shareholders is juxtaposed to a strong board of directors. Similarly, large
British firms mostly have dispersed ownership. Share ownership structures on
the continent deviate from the Anglo-Saxon model in the persistence of

Winteriua n 12, 251 58.
Bebchuk and FCrell, suipra n 17, 131 40 (arguing that states have incenlive o caer to

lo(f
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Ecotonp 1113) and
tlie
poliical theory (see
1\J Roe, Political
Deermunaots q!(ororali(re Go ruame (Oxlrd Ufliversiy
Press, 2003)).

October

2005

Journalof Corporate Lah Studies

blockholdings, and the importance of debt finance is often thought to be
greaten'"" Continental systems are usually considered to be characterised by
"control-oriented finance", as opposed to Anglo-Saxon "arm's-length
finance":' the latter emphasise mechanisms of markets instead of control by
core shareholders. Different decision-making structures resulting from this are
likely to yield different outcomes of competition. While the US debate on
regulatory competition is mostly concerned with conflicts of interest between
dispersed shareholders and managers, regulatory competition may affect the
agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority investors in large,
publicly traded companies.
(b)Reincorporation Wio Decides?
Under US corporate law, a reincorporation in another state normally requires
both a proposal by the board of directors and a shareholder vote;' " the latter
alone is not enough. The requirement of a proposal by the board implies, as
Lucian Bebchuk pointed out, that there will hardly ever be an initiative to
reincorporate (and the board could block one by activist shareholders) if there
were not some advantages also for management itself' If pressures from the
market for takeovers or the managerial labour market are too weak to force
them to initiate a move to a state with shareholder-friendly law, a slant towards
managerial interest is therefore likely.1 4 The necessity of a shareholder vote
remedies this problem only to a limited degree, as shareholders are unable to
effectixvely pursue their interests because of collective action problems and
information asymmetries.'
Dispersed ownership structures and additional
mechanisms of entrenchment make it hard for shareholders to replace an
unwilling board.
150 Sce, Cg R La Por(a, F Lopez-dc-Silanes and A Shlci'lt

"Corporate Ownership around tie

World" (1999) 11 .7ourm!
(1 "Fimnane 4171; R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes, A Shlei er and
R\ Nishn), "Legal Determinants of External Finance" (1997) 52 jourtalq1 Finace 1131;
Mt Becht and A Rdell, "Blockloldhlgs in Europe: Ai International Comparison" (1999) 13
Turpaei Fcono
Rc iea 1049; Roe, supra n 149, 49 56; but seeR, Rajan and 1, Zingalcs, "W'hat
Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data" (1995) 50
7
jour l q1 Fiace
1
1421 (linding that it (urns out that the debt ratios of German companies on debt
are oxerstated when difflerences in accounting standards are taken into account, but also finding
that the debt ratioof' French companies \was considerably higher han both that of' British and
German ones'; A Antoniou, Y Guney and K Paudyal, "Determinants of Corporate Capital
Structures: Evidence iotn European Countries", EFM[A 2002 London Mceings (2002),available
at littp)://ssr.om/abstractid-302833, 6 (stating
that leverage isonly slightly higher in German
companies than inBritish ones, but considerably higher in French otes).
See, eg E Bergl6t, 'A Note on the lypology of Financial Systems" in K Hopt and E \\)meersch
'eds), (mparalizv Corporale G;nviance (Belin/New,
York, \Valter de Gruy(ci- 1997), 15 I, 159 64.
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Similar reasoning can be applied to UK companies with dispersed ownership:
reincorporations clearly favouring managers to the detriment of shareholders
may be even less likely than in the US:"" first, institutional investors in the UK
are known to own a larger total proportion of public firms than their American
counterparts, and take a more "activist" stance vis-a-vis directors. 1 ' Secondly, a
reincorporation to anywhere on the European continent would probably alarm
British shareholders more than a move within the US would alarm their
American counterparts. One should thus not necessarily expect UK firms to
make much use of the potential offered by regulatory competition.

Concentrated ownership structures are likely to have different effects on
regulatory competition for continental European firms. Of course, a
reincorporation is also unlikely to be effected on the continent without the assent
of management; but with the presence of controlling shareholders or even mere
blockholders, an unwilling management is at much greater risk of being
replaced. In practice, with no effective separation of ownership and control in
place, majority shareholders or cooperating blockholders alone will be able to
decide to reincorporate: in the US and the UK, at least the two sides of the
conflict of interest (managers and dispersed shareholders) have to strike a
bargain. On the European continent, large shareholders will often be able to
decide unilaterally. With legal impediments to cross-border reincorporations
being removed, they will often be able to decide on moves into other jurisdictions
single-handedly, without needing the votes of dispersed shareholders, as rational
apathy will frequently give them the majority they need, even if it is a supermajority. Investors may not always realise this problem, resulting in a
disappointment in their economic expectations because of information
asymmetries or boundedly rational behaviour. Thus, one should be at least
cautious with respect to the argument that minority shareholders need not be
protected when buying shares of a foreign company.1 ' '
()

What Icentives Determine ReincorporationDecisions under Concentrated Ownership?

If large shareholders are not required to strike bargains with other interest
groups, the first thing one might expect is reincorporation to a Member State
where corporate law is more favourable to large shareholders by taking, for
example, a more permissive stance on private benefits of control. The resulting
16 Deakin, ./iun87, 206 7.
157See, cg J Armou, BR Chellins and DA Skcel, "Corpora c Ownership Sn uciUie and ihc
Evolution of Bankruptcy Law Lessons from the United Kingdom" (2002) 55
1 1n1riltlhi.1
k
1699, 1750 52.
18 hfslire Art, ufra n 8, para 135. If that statement could be generalised, any manildatory minority
protec(ion wvotild be superfluous. However all major corporale la\w\systems provide at lcast cbr
some mandatory minority protection, which prnia facie h(dicates that it is not superfluous. For a
lunctional comparison, sce H Hansmann and R Kraakrnan, "Th Basic Govrnancc Sttirture",
in R Kraakmnan (cd), The Aialoy q! Corporale Ja. (Oxicrd Univeisity Press, 2004), 33, 54 61.
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slant in favour of large shareholders would be even bigger than the one arguably
favouring management in the US, who may need to make some concessions to
shareholders. There is little reason to believe that they will have an incentive to
subject themselves to a corporate law favouring the minority:'"" pressures from
managerial labour markets and the threat of a hostile takeover, which are often
brought forward as a constraint of managers in the US, do not apply to them.
Once shares have been issued, minority shareholders, as a group, cannot
withdraw their contribution to the firm, and thus lack leverage visa visthe
majority.
Yet there is also a second way of how a controlling shareholder could benefit
from reincorporation, namely by increasing her own wealth by maximising the
total value of the firm, which might in some cases be done by reincorporating in
a Member State with "particularly good law" suitable to the needs of firms with
a dispersed ownership structure. This would be desirable also from the point of
view of minority shareholders, and may even allow large continental
shareholders to let go of their blocks by reincorporating in a Member State the
law of which is rewarded with a premium by capital markets, by virtue of being
good at keeping managers in check. "0
If both the "private benefits" reincorporation and the "firm value
maximisation" options are available to a controlling shareholder, she will only
take the "firm value maximisation" option if the total wealth she can accumulate
by letting go of her control block is greater than the prixvate benefits of control
another Member State might offer In some cases, a moxe to a state offering
larger prixvate benefits might exven be beneficial if it also increases the total value
of the firm. However inefficient moxes will xery often prexail over efficient ones,
since blockholders do not internalise gains accruing to other shareholders.
(d)Possible Consequenices

We have seen that countries seeking to offer attractixve corporate law could
employ two alternative strategies, one that seems desirable ("firm value
maximisation") and one that seems undesirable ("maximisation of prixvate
benefits"), as prixvate benefits will almost certainly decrease firm value beyond a
certain level. Conceivably we might see states pursuing either strategy. However,
if there were actually fierce competition between Member States, a movement
139 See, eg Bet-lxhuk, ./um n 13, 1478 (finding that market mechanisms do little to oppose transfers of

valtic to a controlling shareholder); T get spra n 31, 28 (hypothcsising that "dominant
stockloldters may consider reincorporating for purposes of extracting higher private benefits");
Aton
sutapra n 40, s3,25.
10Armour, ib (arguing that continental Luropean controlling shareholders might be able to
"unwind" and Clivcsiki (hcii holdings by reincorporating in ie UK).There is some exvidenc
that
blockioldings may be unwinding (or have been unxwindihrg) even without regulatory competition.
See, cg D Wjcik, "Change in ihcGerman model of' corporate governance: evidence fiton
blockhioldings 1997 2001" (2003)35 Li on;ment
a d bnug - 1431 58.
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"to the bottom" could happen if it is easier to leave prixvate benefits of control
unchecked than to dexvelop "good law" maximising firm xvalue for competing
states. Instead of using political clout within a particular county to maintain
private benefits, large blockholders might capture the regulatory competition
process.""I Thus, if, in a control-oriented system of corporate governance,
pressures from capital market and even the need to resort to them are smaller,
one should, at the xvery least, expect a greater danger of a movement to the
bottom than in a corporate goxvernance system characterised of public
corporations with dispersed ownership such as the one of the US.
Admittedly, one factor that could mitigate possible negative effects of
regulatory competition would be product markets. A firm with excessixve prixvate
benefits will most likely be at a competitive disadvantage in the long run. Still, if
one follows the theory that dexveloped legal minority protection is correlated to or
even a prerequisite for the dexvelopment of dispersed ownership and capital
markets,16 one might even predict a weakening of minority protection in some
countries and, as a consequence, of stock markets as a result of regulatory
competition (in the absence of significant counter\7ailing factors). The US is not
a good model with which to oppose this argument: first, dispersed ownership was
firmly in place as early as 1932, allowing Berle and Means to write their
pathbreaking study on the separation of ownership and control. " " More
importantly, other mechanisms were in place that prevented the rise of
controlling shareholders." 4
Race-to-the-top advocates might conclude that European laws will remain
more strongly committed to a regulatory approach in corporate law: where the
forces of capital markets are weaker in disciplining managers and controlling
shareholders, an approach faxvouring mandatory law may be economically
superior.""6 Gixven that controlling shareholders will usually be able also to initiate
a reincorporation, they might want to find a way of committing to a regime
friendly to the minority, eg by enhanced supermajority requirements in the
company's charten Howe er, such a commitment to a specific mandatory

, CT A Ferrell, "The Case fow Mandator Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the \orld",
'2004) Harvard Olin Discussion Paper No 492, available al http://sstn .cotf/absian-631221, 12
('As is widely rec:ognised, controlling shareholders on(:e minority shareholders are in the
pic(m'c will lend to ignctrc the harm caused to minority shareholdcrs' intcrecss in the coursc of'
deciding whih actions the firm should undertake"); LA Bebilihuk and 1\tJ Roe, 'A Theory of Path

Dcpendence in Corporate Onctrship and Govcrnancc" (1999) 52 Shnulrd Low Reiew 127,
113 -9 (arguig that, once a concentrated ownership structure is in place, private benefits of
coi 'Olxill assulrc that con i(AlEl'l S have no in(Ci ti\v to move towards a dispcrsed oxiletship
structure).

16 CTLa Pora el at, suran 149, 1145 5 1.
11,1A Berle and G 1eans, 7heilodm Coil}(otio and Prizt Propeily (New York, Macmillen, 1932).
164 \[j Roe, SlroAg A oiagers l,,ak Oxners. The Poliaical Roots oj Americai (oroale Fianue (Princc(il
University Press, 1995), 51 l45.
16, Ct'Baysinger and Budlii supra n 137, 456 61.
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corporate law regime would be difficult and probably come with costs of
reduced flexibility. It seems much more likely that companies would rather
subject themselves to a strong regime of securities regulation,""' which would not
necessarily affect the development of corporate law.
Following the hypothesis that Delaware law is tailored to the needs of typical
American publicly traded firms,"" one would expect the European market to
exhibit more fragmentation and less uniformity also because of ownership
patterns, even once it extends also to large corporations. As long as many large
public companies continue to deviate from what has been called the "standard
model" of corporate law, "" the market should be expected to demand a high
degree of div ersity to accommodate a great variety of idiosyncratic structures
and problems, which precludes the existence of a one-size-fits-all solution.
4. Stakeholder Protection, Creditor Power, and Codetermination
The US discussion only barely touches upon the effects of corporate law on
other stakeholders beside shareholders,"" ' such as creditors and employees, who
cannot directly influence the choice of law decision.' ° However, regulatory
competition in Europe cannot eschew this issue, as most of all the interests of
employees and creditors are much more an issue of corporate law than they are
in the US.
'Were stakeholders able to protect their interests by complete contingent
contracts or by insurance, they could penalise a detrimental corporate law
regime by a premium, eg. higher interest rates in the case of creditors. In that
case, there would be an incentive for shareholders to take those interests into
account when deciding on incorporation.' However, when market failures or
information asymmetries rule out complete contracting, there is little incentive
to take nonshareholder constituencies' interests into account in ex post
reincorporation decisions. 1'2 Furthermore, while some authors suggest that US
corporate law ties shareholders' hands to prevent the expropriation of other
constituencies' quasi-rents, 17' this is not feasible in the presence of large
(1 E Rock, "Securitics legulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Comimcn
(1,1

Thory o'1

Mandatory Disc:losure" (2002) 23 Car(1doz
Laic Reit.i 675; LEL Ribstein, "Cross-listing and
Regulatory Competition" (2005) 1 Reicv oJ Laiv and E ono
s97.
1 7 Posier and Scott, una n 121, 111; Easterbrook andl ischel,,ran 12, 215 16.
11,8H Hansmann and R Kraakman, "The End o" History loi corporate Law" (20)0) 89 (reoraelovii
Lwoi jfurnal/139, I)0.
1 C I,1
l'gbchuk, supra
n 13,1455 (staing that scholars of both directions of thc race sce shareholder
value maxinisation asthe o)jective of corporate law policy).
170C'ibid, 1492 (arguing that statc IawN
wvillbe unable to povidc the cflicicnt 1ule as nonshareholder
constituencies do not participate hi the incorporation decision).
171C'Loifbardo, spra n 47, 322 30.
172
CfBeix luk, usfa n 13, 1485.
171 \R[ Blair and LA Stout, 'A Team Poduction Theory ofCola c Law" ( 1999) 8U) I raia Lt
Re? it, 217, see alsoA Shleier and LH Summers, "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeo ei, in
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shareholders with control over management. Thus, a race to the bottom with
respect to nonshareholder constituencies seems quite likely, eg with respect to tort
creditors, 14 whose interests are normally not aligned with any other constituency,
not even contractual creditors with whom they compete on insolvency quotas.
This may be different with respect to at least some contractual creditors in
view of financial structures on the European continent. According to the
conventional wisdom, institutional creditors such as banks are more concentrated
in Europe (even in the UK) than in the US.' First, the position as a firm's main
bank may give it particularly strong bargaining position and even some
decision-making power within the firm, which may make regulation unnecessary.
Secondly, it may give them the power to favour corporations which are
incorporated in a creditor-friendly Member State. This may mean that
competition will result in a law that is hospitable to large institutional creditors.
Where the interests of this group and trade creditors are aligned, the latter will
also benefit from the large creditors' powerful position. However, where their
interests differ, trade creditors may suffer if they are not powerful or not
sophisticated enough to protect themselves by risk premia, insurance and the
services of credit rating agencies. To some degree, even tort creditors may
benefit from the power of institutional creditors. However, it seems unavoidable
that they suffer on issues where their interests are opposed to the ones of
financial institutions (eg concerning securitisation of debt). This will also depend
to what exact legal mechanisms regulatory competition will extend (see Section
D.3).
With respect to employees, it is obvious that a lot of legislation intended to
safeguard their interests (such as protection against dismissals) lies outside the
scope of corporate law and are only subject to regulatory competition if firms

AJ Auerbach (ed), Corforat "

33.
171Cf Beix luk,

: (,au

and Con seqene (University of Chicago Press, 1988),

ulra ii 13, 14189; see also Eidenmfiller, ,ira n 1, 2236. 1 am not trying to argue that
ior (creditors are patticularly well protcced by tinitum capital and capital main etnance rtules as
required for public corporations by the Second Directive (snra i 92). For critical views, see
J Armo, "Share Capital and Ciheditor Protection: Ellicient Rules (irModern Company Law"
(2000) 63 Modern Lwa. Re e,, 35, 371 72; L Enriques aiidJR \lacey, "Creditors versus Capital
Foriation: The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules" (2001) 86 Caroell Low Review
116) 1204; PO Mdulbert and Al Birke, "Legal Capital Is There a Case agahimt the European
Legal Capital Rules?" (2002) 3 Taropeaii Busi*ess ()r-,
alia Low Reiiew 695 732.
17 CfIJ Roe, "Some Diflerences in Corporate Structure in German),Japaii and the Uiiited States"
'1993) 102 MateJa, Jooroal 1927, 1943 (comparing tlie US, where regulation has kept financial
institutions firagmented, with Germany and Japan); BR Chieffins, "Putthlg Britail on tim Roe
\fap: The Emergence of the Bele Means Corporaion in the United Kingdom", in
JA Mc(Cahery, P Moerland, T Raaijmakers and L Renneboog (eds, Coiflorate Cwo-inanice Reoife.p
(Oxltrd University Press, 2002) 148 159 (Iinding
that British banks were more concenrtrated
nhat
their continental counterparts as early as 1920); T Beck, A Demirgtig-Kunt and R Levine, "Batik
Cotcentration and Crises" (2003) World Bank Policy Research Paper No 3041, available at
http://ssr.om/akstrat ici-432081 (data oii
concentration in the banking industr).
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are able to relocate plants at low cost (or indirectly through product market
competition). However, employees are affected only when legal mechanisms
attach to the corporate form, such as the codetermination systems in place in
several Member States.'"
Irrespective of whether codetermination is economically beneficial or
detrimental, up to now, firms have been committed to the current regime by
impediments and costs of reincorporation. If codetermination actually induces
beneficial firm-specific human capital investments by employees, the possibility
or the threat to reincorporate allows shareholders to expropriate employees'
quasi-rents without being able to commit to a specific national law. If such
investments are beneficial, this may make a good case for European
harmonisation. However, this approach is obviously problematic for firms or
industries where specific investments by employees are not present.

D.

FEDERAL AND

SUPRANATIONAL

INFLUENCE

1. Europe and Roe's Thesis of Vertical Competition
While EU company law measures of harmonisation were designed to create
uniformity among Member States, the effect of the federal law on the regulatory
competition process in the US has long received little attention in the academic
debate.
Of course, the new European Company Statute1" is of some importance, as
it offers, at least with respect to those issues not left to national law, a federal type
of company that could, in theory, compete with national forms. However, for
various reasons, the European Union itself is unlikely to actively engage the
market for corporate law, 1 0 and the national varieties of the European Company
can only compete with each other for firms that are willing to actually transfer
their "real seat" to the state of incorporation.19
The more interesting question is how actual and potential federalisation
affects the development on the national level. In a recent article, Mark Roe has
suggested that Delaware's actual competitors are not the other US states, but
actors on the federal level. The incentive shaping Delaware corporate law is thus
not potential reincorporation to other states, but the permanent threat of
federalisation of the law of publicly traded corporations, for which Roe cites
176Dcakin, supra n 87, 207.
177Regulation 2157/2001 EC 120011 oJ L29/1.
178On ihc parallel case ol Canada, wherc lo'dcral incorporation has been pcri ntcd as an altcrnativc
to 11:corporation in one of the provinces, see Romano,

ulmi n 12, 118 28 (generally arguing that

the Iederal government, other than a small sate, does not have incentives to create good
corporate law).
179 See spra n 134.
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some actual historic examples, such as the 1933 and 1934 Acts and the
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002.""' Beside Congress, the SEC, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals' (when interpreting securities laws) and the New York Stock
Exchange are the most important actors. '1 If Delaware oversteps its permissible
bounds, federal decision makers could intervene, or threaten to do so. In some
cases such intervention was averted only by policy changes in Delaware. 3 Actual
intervention is thus not required to influence state corporate law, but its
permanent threat may push Delaware into the desired direction. Thus, in Roe's
theory, whether Delaware corporate law is good or bad is ultimately not a matter
of a race to the top or bottom between states, but into what direction state law is
pushed by federal actors.
2. Consequences for Europe
The obvious question for Europe, raised by Roe himself, is what influence
European law will have on state competition in the future, and whether the threat
of or actual Europeanisation of corporate and securities law will pull the
Member State's company into one direction or the other. 4
However, there are some fundamental differences: first, under the EU
political system, the Council, Commission and Parliament act considerably
more slowly as legislators than do the US Congress concerning issues of
corporate law. In the US, federal legislation in corporate law has usually been
the result of issues discussed on the federal level; for example, the 1933 and
1934 Acts resulted from the depression and perceived problems of capital
markets that had contributed to it; the Williams Act of 1968 was the answer to
an increase in dubious takeover attempts during the 1960s;8 5 most recently, the
Sarbanes Oxley Act was the result of Enron and other corporate governance
scandals. Admittedly, the EU Commission has become much more active than it

Roe, sqpra n 25,588; cl Kahan and Karnar; sapra n 22, 679, 741

(arguing that

the re was no aumal

state competition, but that it was possible in theory); Bebliuk and Hamdani, ufra n 20, 580 83;
see also Bebchk, sora n 13 1454 (arguing that tie threat of' Iederal legislative intervention might
prevent decisionmakers in Delaware from introducing value-decreasing statutes); MJ Roe,
"Delaware's Politics" (2005) available alhttp://ssii.coin/abstictl-601962
(analysing tie
interplay of Delaware and federal law from a public choice perspective). On the Sarbanes Oxley
Provisions on audit committee sc,
cg LE 1ivchcll, "The Sarbanes Oxley Act and ihc
Reinvention of Corporate Governance" (2003) 48 lillaunraLow R ipiv 1189, 1198 (speakiilg of a
"I'deralization of' corporate governance").
ll The Second Circuit includes the states of New York, Connecticut and Vermont (28 USC s 1l),
and thus adjudicatcs in many cases involving securities law.
11 Roe,
flia n 25, 592.
]8 In tie course of the tXwcnticth century. the issue of' leiccralisation of' corporatc law was discussed

several times. See ibid, 602 7. One important example is the Delaware case law on hostile
akcovrs.

Ml lbid, 643-44.
1 See, cg Clark, sapra n 19, 546 48.
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had previously been in company and securities law,"" and the EU may be
attempting to streamline its legislative and regulative processes, " but in
comparison with the maybe sometimes hasty US legislation, it is still rather a
cumbersome giant, under whose auspices projects that were discussed for many
years, such as the Takeover Directive,. 8 can sometimes be delayed by particular,
sometimes unrelated national interests."") So far, spectacular insolvencies in
Europe have had immediate effects only on the level of the respectiv e Member
State, in which most of the media attention to corporate governance scandals
occurs. As a consequence, reforms are usually called for on the Member State
lexvel. Just two of many examples are the German KonTraG of 1998
and the
auditing reforms in Austria in 2001 which ultimately were the result of two
bank insolvencies.'' If a similar pattern prev ailed in the US, Enron would have
resulted in a reform of the corporate law of the state of Oregon;12 however,
there was a rather speedy reaction in the form of a federal law. A major factor
shaping the decisions of legislators and others is the public discussion in the
media, in which, in Europe, political discussions are waged rather on the
national than the European level. As long as there is no European public sphere,
one can safely expect that in Europe, a crisis will normally result in national
rather than supranational intervention. European regulation tends to deal with
more fundamental issues and is sometimes discussed for decades before
enactment.
Differences in the court system are probably even more significant: the ECJ,
as far as it is asked to deal with issues of company and securities law at all, can
hardly be compared to the Federal Appellate Court for the 2nd Circuit and the
US Supreme Court, whose adjudicatixve activity regularly goes back to claims to

C 'I l

'[
i'r C(
pual)

La

and Eiialn,

(,
oroa1le (r erlace in It European ULnio A Plan

fo

I n, 1 (COM 12011;I 28<1final) available at http://eurota.eult/eur-lex/en/am/111/2003
con 2003 02114en0 I.pdl; last accessed I May 2005.
SCfE Ferran, Buld i at; El Scun ti Market
o
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), 61 126
'discussing the lamlaltssy process).

Directive 2001/25 EC 120041IJ

L142/12.

1 See, cg Fcrran, supran 17, 1 l6 17 (discussing tie impact of' the disputc about the status of,
Gibraltar on the takeover directive).

"I'KonTraG Gesez zt Kontrollc und Transparcnz imn
Untercnehmnsbercich (law on contiol and
transparency in business), 27 April 1998, (German) BGBI 1998 1,786; see,
eg D Drner, Andert
das KonTraG die Anl dicrungen an den Abschlulpr tilir" (1
998) 42 Der Beirieb
I,I (staing that
the legislation was the result of corporate governance scandals).
I The FM[AG of 2001 (Bundcesgesc ti uber dic Errichtung und Organisation der Finanzmarktausic:htsbeh6rde, Austrian BGBI 1 2001/97, resulted in an inrease and diffrentiation of
the auditor's liability cap and an innroduction of nandatory atidior roation. See ( Nowotny and
l Gelter, "Die Prutferrotation nach dem FIAG" (2001 11 0,, nuhi t
dniift
s fiir
Redt untd
Redina g
1se1
325; W Dehn, "Die Haltung des Abschitissprulirs nach s 275 HGB (nF)" (2002)50
Batk Irchin
377.
102Enron was incorporated in Oregon. See, cg M Cole, "Diaw\are Is Not a State': AreW
Witnessing Jurisdictional Competition in Bankruptcy-" (2002) 55 Vtadcrhplt a.b,Reviev 18 5,
1874.
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damages resulting from the violation of protective norms of securities law.'"3 In
Europe, these issues are normally dealt with by national courts, and the rare
cases in which the ECJ has been asked for a preliminary opinion (on the
interpretation of EU directives) have led to few meaningful substantive solutions.
But most importantly, Europe lacks a capital markets regulator comparable to
the SEC, which is specialised in its field and can relatively quickly issue
regulations binding on public corporations; thus, the SEC frequently interferes
with companies' corporate governance structures. Good examples are proxy
rules, 9 4 which affect the stockholders' ability to vote and thus a core field of
the inner affairs of the corporation,'"" or the SEC's recent proposal aiming at
gixving minority shareholders the opportunity to propose a competing short slate
of candidates for the board of directors. "" Europe also lacks a pan-European
stock exchange comparable to the NYSE, whose listing requirements (under
sometimes considerable influence of the SEC""7) also affects corporate
governance. But exven if a European SEC or NYSE existed, as long as European
competition focuses on closely held corporations, the influence of capital market
institutions is irrelevant anyway.
All this leads to the conclusion in spite of EU attempts at harmonisation in
corporate and securities law that the gravitational pull of the EU level of
legislation and regulation is likely to be significantly weaker than that of the US
federal lexvel. No potential supplier in the market for European corporate law
would haxve much to fear from the threat of the EU taking away its powers (as
US federal law does). The latitude of discretion assigned to competitors will thus
remain considerably larger than in the US, exven though the difference is one of
degree, rather than absolute.
Furthermore, the pressure of economic incentives by which potential
Europeanisation would force EU Member States to pursue a "supranational"
course in its policy measures will be reduced. For Delaware, federalisation is a
considerable threat: the more its own discretion is reduced by federal authorities,
the more it loses of its special competitixve advantage and its exceptional position
among US states, which yields a considerable proportion of state income.
Delaware will avoid putting that at risk. Howe er, as long as no state is in a
similar position that is, of near-complete dependency on corporate law in

"I Good examples are suits i clanages due ioinsider (rading. See Allen and Kraakmnan, sapra n 19,
90 91. The prohibition of insider trading largely developed from Securities Exchange Act

s I0(b) and the SEC rule
1Oh-5, which wvere
originally directed atf iiadulen practices in sales of'
securities.
See Kirdo; \t....l(..
6urln Co, 69 F Supp 12 (ED Pa 19b
l,; SEC r 7x G/f,TS11phtr
Co, 401 F 2d 833 (2d ( ir19u8, cer denied 394 US 976 (I
969' C1aIa
F, rUd
v
S
45
1a-e,
US
222 (198(/);
Dirks rSE(, 4 6 3 1S 646 (1983,; seeClark, niva 1 19, 3(09 56.
Scctiics Exchange Act, s 14, 15USC s 78n; SEC Regulation 14A, 17CFR s 240.14A.
See also
Roe, utia n 25, 612 11.

SEC Proposal No 34-48626 of'
14 Ocober 2003, 68 FR 60784.
Roe, ,u/a n 25, 599 600.
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Europe, the threat of supranationalisation is much less drastic for any participant
in the market. The weak incentives to compete for Member States are
counterbalanced by a weak supranational gravitational pull.
3. Approaches Similar to Harmonisation in Creditor Protection
It is sometimes speculated that whether the German GmbH and other
continental types of corporations will be the "vxictims" of regulatory competition,
which the UK private limited company seems to be winning. This has already
encouraged some countries to eliminate or reduce minimum capital
requirements.' 8 Conspicuously, capital adequacy and maintenance requirements
are xvirtually non-existent in the US. Usually other measures are considered to be
important for creditor protection, which are regulated either by federal law or by
uniform laws."" ' The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and the older Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act have been implemented, in some form, in all the US
states.2"0 Those laws not only address transfers with the actual intention to
defraud creditors. A transaction will be considered a fraudulent transfer in two
cases: in the first case, the debtor either "was engaged or was about to engage in
a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction";20' in the second
case, he or she must have (2) "intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should
have beliexved that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability to
pay as they became due".2° 2 The proxision also coxers div idend payments,2° one
of the main targets of the Second EU Directive.204 Foreseeability by the
beneficiary is not necessary for the application of the statute.
In the US, insolxency law (referred to as bankruptcy law) is federal law;2° 5 and
it also includes a provision mirroring fraudulent conveyances.2 °) Federal courts
developed the doctrine of equitable subordination," which allows for a
subordination of certain types of problematic claims to the benefit of other

8 See .uia 1196.

199See also Trogcr; supr n 31, 54 n 225.
201Ultimately, those statutes go back to an English statute of 157 1. See len and Kraakrnan, v/m n
19, 140; Thy') Case (1601) 3 Coke 80b, 76 Elk 809; sec also Clark, supra n 19, 44 45 nil.
0 Uniform l rauduleit Traisfer Act, s 1(a)(2)(i).
202Unilirn Fatudlclnt TranslT Act, s 4(a)(2)(ii).
201 On the discussion, see Clark, .wmi n 19, 88 90; eg I I s ,-h-,Back ' D ert liew I.cildiu S1uI/lie,
475 F Stipp 693 (D Ncv 1978); hi reJenkis Jandcap~n and FExcaaii, In, 93 BR 84 (WD Va 1988);
A Re Dondi hinancial Cif, 119 BR 106 (Bkrt, ND lex 199 , but see RO Kumrnert, "State
Statutory Restricions on Financial Distribtuions h% Corpoalions to Shareholders: Part I" (1984)
59 it
isiot, Lan lb
fl ,
185.
201Sccond Dirctiv, sa.am n 92, Art 15.

US Consttution, Art 1s 8.
L03

2I

I USC, s 548.
/tia n 19, 52 71; Allen and Kraakrnan, vnim n 19, 11 156.

207 See Clark,
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debtors. Thus, the only important doctrine aimed at creditor protection under
state law is veil-piercing.9)8
This adds up to the picture that creditor protection mostly remains outside
the scope of regulatory competition in the US. Admittedly, there is an incipient
discussion on regulatory competition in bankruptcy law, as debtors appear to
have considerable discretion as to where to file for bankruptcy protection.20
However, this is limited by the fact that all bankruptcy courts are bound by the
Bankruptcy Code and decisions of higher courts and ultimately the US Supreme
Court.
By contrast, issues of creditor protection are in part an issue of company law
in Europe (and also an important aim of the EC Company Law Directives).
With the ECJ apparently setting tight limits to the application of mechanisms of
corporate law to foreign companies in Itispire Art, effects of competition on
creditor interests are likely to depend on the applicability of instruments of
insolvency law to companies incorporated in other EU and EEA Member States,
and on the courts of which state will be in charge of insolvency proceedings.
According to Article 3(1) of the Council Regulation on Insolvency
Proceedings, 21ii "The courts of the Member State within the territory of which
the centre of a debtor's main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open
insolvency proceedings". Article 3(2) sets out a presumption that the main
interests are at the place of the registered office, and other states may only open
proceedings if there is an establishment in the particular state, and the
proceedings have to be restricted to the assets there in that case. However, the
presumption can be rebutted, and some national courts have vigorously asserted
their jurisdiction. For example, a German court, the Amtgericht Hamburg, found
that it could open proceedings over an English letterbox company, and it even
stated that its shareholders could not rely on limited liability as it was grossly
undercapitalised 2 ' Likewise, the English High Court found that insolvency
proceedings could be opened in England over a German holding company
which, in the eyes of the court, had the centre of its business activities in
Bradford.212 In the Eurojoods case, concerning an Irish subsidiary of Parmalat
20IThere may be some regulatory competition on vedi pierciig. For example, Nevada has promoted
its corporate lawmwvith the argument tha eil piercing is more dilficult than in all other states. Cf
Kahan and Kamari ra n 22, 717.
20 See, eg Cole, sapra 1n 192, 1845.

210Regulation 1316/2000 EW 120001 OJ L160/1.
1 Amtsgcricht Hamnburg, 14 May 2003, 67g IN 3,58/02, (2003) 6 ,Aue Zus&/riliJar (;ei& aisrechi

732; see also Antsgericlit t\ldnchengladbach, April 27, 2001, 19 IN 54/ 10, 200) 26 Z
P irrv/aJ1sreit 1(T64 (Gciman ctt
ob'j-tion of tile company).
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assertingjtiisdiction cibprimary insoi\ ncy proceedings over

212In Re Daisek JSA Lid and others, [2004] BPIR 30. A German cour, lie Amtsgerich DusseldorfI
initially considered Lnglish insolvency proceedings void in its decision of 6 June 2003, 502 IN
126/I3, (2003) 25 Ieslritfijr firlsciqisrechl 1363, but finally had to amend this decision alter
the ease was remanded by a higher court. See AG Dfissetort 12 Mairch 2004, 502 IN 126/03,

'2004) 26 Zeitscri1Jr JIsirischalisreehit 623.
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over which both Italian and Irish courts had claimed jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court of the Republic Ireland has referred a number of questions concerning
the interpretation of the Regulation to the ECJ."'
The effects of regulatory competition on creditor interests will partly depend
on how national courts and the ECJ will deal with the Regulation. If insolvency
proceedings will usually be initiated in the state of incorporation, the effects
described in Section C.4 are likely to pertain also to insolvency law. Furthermore,
even when the issue of jurisdiction is clear, national courts have to grapple with
the question of whether the application of national doctrines of insolvency law
(as well as corporate law) is compatible with the freedom of establishment under
the criteria set out by the ECJ. 14 If the bounds set by the ECJ are narrow, the
effects of regulatory competition will be stronger.

E.

SUMMARY

The analysis in this article has shown that the structural conditions of European
market for corporate law differ from the US in several respects.
On the supply side, a European Delaware is virtually impossible. Delaware
owes its unique position to unusual historical circumstances, which cannot be
expected to be reproduced in twenty-first-century Europe. Even without the
current prohibition of franchise tax, small European states are badly positioned
to offer advantages which could allow them to become quasi-monopolists, which
is, in turn, a precondition for a credible commitment to the kind of corporate
law favoured by the market.
On the demand side, legal, administrative an(1 cultural factors are likely to
reduce market demand as such, and thus slow (town the race either to the top or
bottom. The focus of regulatory competition on newly founded corporations,
and even European financial structures among publicly traded firms are likely to
reinforce fragmentation in the market. With less developed capital markets on
the continent, and continental large shareholders being able to control
reincorporation without having to bargain with the minority, a movement "to the
bottom" cannot be ruled out. Large institutional creditors may also be able to
influence the development in their favour, which may be detrimental to other
groups of nonshareholder constituencies and even shareholders.

In IR'
h E/lou II

Ltd. [2004 IESC 45 (27Jly 200).

21 In hs/ire Arl, supra n 8, para 133, (lie EC J refes to the criteria set out in Case C 55/94 Rcinhard

(lhard r Conglio (Itl'Odc ,o 4

A ocati e Procuatori di Alihao [19951 ECR 4165. National

imeasures hindering or making less attracive (ie exercise of' the liecedoms "must be applied in a
non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by mnperative requirements in the public
interes(; the must be suitable 1i securing the attainment of the objective which they piust, and

they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it".
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The European level of legislation and regulation is less likely to influence the
conduct of national actors in the market than the federal level in the US,
because Europe lacks an influential common public sphere, the legislative process
is slow, and there is no court system or European securities authority with
substantiv e influence on corporate law in place.
However, while the danger of a race to the bottom as such seems to be larger
in Europe than in the US, and while federal influence (in whatever direction)
seems weaker, both the reduced incentives for states on the supply side and
certain impediments on the demand side are likely to slow down the competitive
development of corporate law considerably, in whatever direction it may be
going.

